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REAL PROOF: I
JEROME MICHAEL* and MORTIMER J. ADLERt
I. INTRODUCTION'
§ 1. The Aspects of The Trial of An Issitc of Fact
The trial of an issue of fact is an epistemic, a logical, and a legal
affair.2 In its epistemic aspect it can be viewed as a process of learning:
By means of the trial the jury acquires the knowledge which it must have
in order to decide the issue.3 The analysis of this aspect of a trial is
primarily concerned with the different kinds of knowledge and with the
various ways in which knowledge is obtained.4 In its logical aspect the
trial of an issue of fact can be viewed as a process of teaching: By their
*Nash Professor of Law, Columbia University.
tProfessor of the Philosophy of Law, University of Chicago.
1. In spite of its own intrinsic importance and of its great significance for testimonial
proof, the commentators upon the law of evidence have greatly neglected real proof. For
example, of the ten volumes which comprise the third edition (1940) of Wigunore on
Evidence, nine are textual. These nine contain 93 chapters and 6,601 pages of which a
single chapter (c. 39) of 62/ pages is devoted to what the author chooses to call Autoptic
Proference (Real Evidence), and 29 of these pages are given to "views." For discussions
of this type of judicial proof, see MICHAEL & ADLER., THE NATURE OF JUDICIAL PROOF
c. 8 (1931) ; Michael & Adler, The Trial of An Issue of Fact, 34 COL. L. REv. 1224, 1262-
70 1293-93, 1462, 1466-67 (1934); GULSoN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PROOF 194-200, 281-91
(1905) ; 5 CHAMBERLAYNE, EVIDENCE c. 40 (1916) ; Phipson, "Real" Evidence, 29 YALE L.
J. 705 (1920); 4 WIGMOPE, EvIDEN C c. 39 (3d ed. 1940); WIGmoRE, THE SCIENCE OF
JUDICIAL PROOF §§ 5, 324-28 (3d ed. 1942); PHiPsoN, EvIDENcE 2, 4-6, 44-46 (8th ed.
1942) ; Gex, Real Evidence in Mississippi, 17 Miss. L.J. 180 (1945) ; Garment,
Real Evidence: Use and Abuse, 14 BRooxiLYN L. REv. 261 (1948) ; Nokes, Real Evidence,
65 L.Q. Rav. 57 (1949). We shall refer to Wigmore's Treatise and that of Chamberlayne
by the names of the authors.
For an excellent study of the nature of direct or perceptual knowledge, see H. H. PRICE,
PERCEPrON (1933).
2. In The Trial of An Issue of Fact, 34 COL. L. REv. 1224 & 1462 (1934), we attempted
to summarize our analyses of the epistemic, logical and legal aspects of a trial. That
article was intended as the introduction to a series of more detailed articles, of which
this article is the first. In this one we shall have to make a number of analytical points
which cannot be fully explained without undue repetition of parts of our prior article.
The reader must therefore be referred to it for the understanding of several of these points
which are basic. We shall use the symbol TIF to make such references.
3. Throughout this essay we shall assume that the issues of fact of which we speak
are being tried by a tribunal consisting of a judge and a jury. But the nature of real
proof is the same whether it occurs during the trial of a material issue by such a tribunal
or by a tribunal consisting only of a judge. Indeed, a trial by a judge without a jury is
governed by the same principles of logic and, in the main, by the same rules of procedural
law as a trial by jury. We shall use the word "tribunal" when we wish to refer to both
judge and jury or, indifferently, to either judge or jury. Whenever we use the word
"judge" we shall mean the trial judge.
4. In modem times the analysis of the kinds of knowledge and of the processes of
cognition is called epistemology. This indicates the derivation of the word "epistemic."
In an earlier tradition such considerations would have been regarded as falling in part
within the domain of metaphysics in so far as the kinds of knowledge are correlative to
the kinds of things known, and in part within the domain of psychology in so far as
knowledge results from operations of the mind.
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proof and disproof5 of the contradictory propositions of which the issue
is constituted," the litigants impart to the jury the knowledge which it
needs in order to resolve the issue. The analysis of this aspect of a trial
distinguishes the kinds of propositions which are employed in the proof and
disproof of material propositions,7 formulates the conditions of the asser-
tion of propositions as true or false or as probable to some degree, and
states the rules of contradiction and of inference 'which are the criteria of
the formal validity of the probative processes which litigants undertake.
In its legal aspect a trial can be viewed as a judicially administered proceed-
ing designed to resolve material issues,8 but serving other ends as well.
The rules of procedural law which govern the judicial administration of a
trial, having these various ends in view, determine how a jury may acquire
the knowledge it needs and what litigants may do in their efforts at proof
and disproof. The analysis of this aspect of a trial first recognizes the
different ends which the procedural law serves, among which are correct,
or better rather than worse, answers to material issues and a just disposi-
tion of controversies; it then examines the procedural rules as means to
5. The reader must recognize the distinction between the process of proof and the
process of persuasion. He will find this distinction made and explained in TIF, 1237-40.
Throughout the course of this article we shall be concerned exclusively with the process
of proof.
6. A question can be perfect or imperfect. A perfect question is one to which two but
only two answers are possible; an imperfect question is one to which more than two
answers are possible. The two possible anwers to a perfect theoretical question, that is,
a question which can be answered by knowledge alone, are contradictory propositions.
They are contradictory in the sense that if one is true the other must be false; and one
must be true; it must be true in the sense that what it states to be the case is actually
the case. If we let P represent any proposition, it is obvious that P and not-P are related
as contradictory propositions. To deny P is equivalent to affirming not-P. Consequently.
if one of the parties to a legal controversy alleges and the other denies P, the issue thus
created is of the form "P or not-P." See TIF, pp. 1248-51.
7. A proposition is material to a legal controversy if the matter of fact to which it
refers is rendered significant for that controversy by the rule of substantive law by which
the controversy is regulated. [For a more detailed explanation of the conception of
materiality, see Michael, The Basic Rules of Pleading, 5 REcoaD 1, 10-11 (Ass'n of the Bar
of N. Y. City 1950), and TIF, 1251-53; and for the distihiction between materiality and
relevancy and that between material propositions and evidential propositions, see TIF,
1277-78.1 What we call material propositions are traditionally referred to as material or
principal or ultimate or operative facts (for a criticism of this verbal usage see TIF,
1252) ; and what we call evidential propositions are traditionally referred to as probative
or evidential facts or, more simply, as evidence. (For the distinction between fact and
proposition, see TIF, 1248-50). The distinction between materiality, which is a legal con-
ception, and relevancy, which is a logical conception, is indispensable to an understanding
of judicial proof. It is obscured by the fact that in legal usage the word "materiality" is
ambiguous. It is sometimes used with the meaning which we assign to it, but not always
Thus, unless the word "immaterial" as used in the objection to "evidence" as "irrelevant,
immaterial and incompetent" is redundant, it means either that the evidence is not rele-
vant to a legally significant proposition or that, although it is relevant to such a propo-
sition, it is of too little probative force to be admissible. (See 1 CHAMBERLAYNFE § 16).
The distinction between materiality and relevancy is also obscured by the attempted dis-
tinction between "logical relevancy" and "legal relevancy."
8. By a material issue we mean an issue constituted of a material proposition and its
contradictory. See note 6, supra.
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these ends.9 This leads to a clearer understanding of procedural rules in
the light of the ends which they serve and of the processes of proof and
persuasion which they govern, and also to their criticism in the light of
rational criteria provided by the epistemic and logical analyses of these
processes.
It is clear at once that these three aspects of a trial of an issue of facc
are integrally related and, hence, that they cannot be analyzed in isolation
from one another. The process by which litigants prove and disprove
material propositions is the very process by which a jury acquires knowledge
about the matters of fact to which these propositions relate. The process
which, from the point of view of jurors, is a passive affair of learning or
inference and, from the point of view of litigants, an active affair of teach-
ing or proof, is a single process.' 0  Moreover, the kinds of knowledge
imparted to a jury are perfectly correlated with the kinds of propositions
which are employed probatively; and the consideration of the manner in
which a jury obtains this knowledge parallels the consideration of the con-
ditions underlying the assertion of propositions as the result of their proof.
Since it is this process, at once an affair of learning and an affair of proof,
which the rules of procedural law govern, the rules, and especially those
of th'e law of evidence, must take account of the nature and kinds of knowl-
edge and of the elements of proof. However, the legal aspect of a trial
is not strictly co-ordinate with its epistemic and logical aspects. To the
extent that the procedural rules aim to direct the administration of a trial
so that correct or better answers to material issues will be achieved, epis-
temic considerations and rules of logic provide standards for criticizing
them. The epistemic and logical analyses enable us to say what the law
should be, and, by the norms which they provide, to measure the goodness
of the lav as it is. On the other hand, the legal aspect is in one sense
primary: The rules of procedural law which direct the judicial administra-
tion of a trial grow out of its nature as a legal proceeding; judicial proof is
a special case of proof; and the process of learning which goes ol in
court has limitations imposed upon it just because it goes on in court and
involves a judge and jury, lawyers, litigants and witnesses. The logical
and epistemic analyses of a trial must therefore be made with awareness of
the kind of affair the trial of an issue of fact actually is.
9. If the rule of substantive law which regulates a controversy is a just rule, and if
correct, or better rather than worse, answers are given to the material issues which the
controversy involves, the controversy will be justly resolved. This indicates the relation
between truth and justice. See TIF, 1228-33.
10. We shall use the word "inference" to refer to the intellectual operations performcd
by the jury in the course of its learning. Inference and proof are thus correlative aspects
of the same process. See TIF, 1270 n.69.
[ VOL,. 5
REAL PROOF
We shall be primarily concerned in this essay with only one kind of
proof that can occur in the trial of an, issue of fact, the kind which we
shall call real proof to distinguish it from testimonial and circumstantial
proof, and which always occurs whenever what is traditionally known as
"real evidence" is employed." But real proof cannot be intelligibly analyzed
in isolation. Testimonial and circumstantial proof are often collateral to
real proof; and the step of real proof is usually a step in a line of proof
in which steps of testimonial and circumstantial proof necessarily precede
and follow it.'- The legal principles which govern real proof, which formu-
late the conditions of the admissibility of "real evidence," must therefore
be considered in the light not only of epistemic and logical analyses but
also of an awareness of the place of real proof in the total probative process.
Rules which are applicable to testimonial or circumstantial proof are often
necessarily involved in the determination of the admissibility of real proof.13
Moreover, it will become apparent as we proceed that there is a close analogy
between some of the problems of real proof and some of the problems of
testimonial proof, 14 and that in testimonial and in circumstantial proof, as
well as in real proof, the problem of judicial notice, which is the question
what propositions which are capable of being proved may be assumed and
employed probatively without being proved, is a crucial problem.15 But it
is obviously impossible to achieve such an integration of related problems
within the scope of a single article. For that reason we must ask the reader
to hold before him the pidure of a trial as a whole and in all of its aspects
in order to see our discussion of real proof in perspective.' 6 Wherever it is
possible to do so by brief reference, we shall connect our analysis of real
proof with the larger analysis, point to similar problems in testimonial and
11. It has also been called material evidence and demonstrative evidence. "A preferable
term," Wigmore has said, "is Autoptic Proference; this avoids the fallacy of attributing
an evidential quality to that which is in fact nothing more nor less than the thing itself."
1 Wia mroR § 24. We are aware that the phrase "real proof" does not occur in the traditional
language of the courts and commentators; this is partly due, as the quotation from Wigmore
indicates, to their failure to recognize and understand the probative use of "real evidence."
That the probative use of what they call by that name always involves an inference and,
usually the sort of inference which we call real proof, will subsequently be shown. See p.
358 infra.
12. For the distinction between a step and a line of proof, see p. 358, infra.
13. That is to say that the admissibility of a step of real proof may depend upon the
admissibility of one or more steps of testimonial or of circumstantial proof. An offered
step of real proof may be in itself unobjectionable but nevertheless inadmissible because one
or more steps of testimonial or circumstantial proof, the accomplishment of which is nec-
essary to satisfy what we shall call the logical condition of the admissibility of the step
of real proof, are inadmissible.
14. At this point we have especially in mind the cognitive conditions of the competency
of a person to be a witness, the cognitive elements of credibility, and the rules regulating
the probative use of the "opinions" of witnesses, particularly those of inexpert witnesses.
15. As pointed out in TIF 1265 n.58, the act of judicially noticing a proposition is a
special case of the act of assuming a proposition, that is, of asserting without proof propo-
sitions which can be proved.
16. The reader is referred to TIF for this picture in its entirety.
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circumstantial proof, and suggest consistent solutions of them. And here,
as a necessary introduction to the problems of real proof, we must briefly
summarize the basic points in our analysis of the epistemic, logical and legal
aspects of a trial.
§ 2. The Indispensability of Evidence
Four kinds of knowledge can be and almost always are involved in a
trial: (1) Knowledge which the jury has independently of the evidence and
proofs of the litigants, most of which it will possess prior to the trial
because in the locality of the trial such knowledge is common to ordinary
men of ordinary experience, but some of which it may acquire during the
trial ;17 (2) knowledge which the jury acquires by means of its senses in the
observation of things' s and events which the litigants are permitted to
introduce as evidence; (3) knowledge which the jury acquires by means of
its reason in making the inferences involved in the steps and lines of proof
which the litigants are permitted to accomplish; and (4) knowledge which
witnesses are permitted to report or which is contained in documents which
the litigants are permitted to exhibit to the jury.19
Without knowledge of the third sort, that obtained inferentially during
a trial by its rational powers, a jury could never decide a material issue; if
it could, a trial need not and would not involve proof. But the mind can
perform inferences only if it has or is given som, knowledge with which to
begin the inferential process; it is clearly impossible for all knowledge to
be the result of inference. A jury, therefore, can gain knowledge inferen-
tially only by the operations of its reason upon knowledge which it has or
obtains independently of the proofs of the litigants; and such knowledge
must be knowledge of either the first or the second sort. It must be either
knowledge of which a jury may take judicial notice or knowledge which
results from its observation of evidence, that is, of things and events which
with judicial permission are exhibited to its senses during the trial. When-
ever the knowledge which a jury may judicially notice is sufficient, as it
rarely is, to enable it to resolve a material issue, it is obviously unnecessary
to try that issue, that is, to test it by the proof and disproof of the contra-
dictory propositions of which it is constituted.2 0  The trial of a material
17. The reference here is to knowledge which, in traditional language, may be judicially
noticed. For some aspects of the judicial notice of propositions, see TIF 1263 11.57, 1264-65.
18. By a "thing" we shall always mean a physical thing, that is, a thing composite of
form and matter. An "event" always involves such a thing; it may be defined as a physical
thing in motion.
19. This fourth kind of knowledge, the knowledge of witnesses and of the authors
of documents, is not co-ordinate with the first three kinds, which consist of knowledge
which the jury somehow has or acquires. See TIF, 1267 n.64.
20. Ordinarily, if one of the litigants alleges and the other traverses a material
proposition, a material issue, consisting of the proposition alleged and its contradictory,
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issue is necessary only when in order to decide it the jury needs other knowl-
edge than that which it may judicially notice; and such knowledge it is
permitted to obtain only from the observation of evidence. It follows that
a trial of a material issue necessarily involves the introduction of evidence.
The point can be made differently. Implicit in the foregoing discussion
are two further distinctions between kinds of knowledge. (1) Knowledge
is either direct or indirect according as it is obtained by man's sensitive
powers in perception or by man's rational powers in inference. 2' This
distinction holds equally for the knowledge of jurors and for that of wit-
nesses.22  A particular item of the knowledge of either a juror or a witness
may be direct or indirect, may have been acquired by perception or by
inference.2 3 (2) Knowledge of things and events is either particularized
is created; and this issue can be resolved only by trying it. But if the tribunal will
judicially notice either the proposition which is alleged or its contradictory, no issue
is created or, at least, none the resolution of which requires a trial. A recent case
which makes the point is Virginian Ry. v. Armenitrout, 158 F.2d 358 (4th Cir. 1946),
in which the court held that the judge erred in submitting to the jury the issue whether
or not the plaintiff, a child of thirteen months, "was of sufficient mental capacity to
understand the meaning of such signals [ringing a bell and blowing a whistle] so as to
get off the track if they had been given." The court said: It is "common knowledge
that a baby of 13 months is not equipped with reasoning powers." Id. at 360.
21. We shall sometimes speak of direct knowledge as perceptual or observational,
and of indirect knowledge as inferential.
22. This suggests in part the importance for testimonial proof of an analysis of
real proof. When discussing "real evidence" the commentators and the courts seem to
recognize that there is an essential distinction between perceptual and inferential knowl-
edge. For example, discussing "autoptic proference," Wigmore says (1 WIGMORE § 24) :
"No logical process is employed; only an act of sensible apprehension occurs,--appre-
hension of the existence or non-existence of the thing as alleged." And he adds (4 WIG-
moRo § 1150) : "This source [of belief] differs from the other two [testimonial and
circumstantial evidence] in omitting any step of conscious inference or reasoning, and
in proceeding by direct self-perception or autopsy." So, too, Chamberlayne calls "real
evidence" evidence by perception, knowledge acquired through the use of the faculties
of sense perception. 1 (CHAMBRIAYNE §§ 27-31.) But, curiously enough, when dis-
cussing the administration of the opinion rule, they deny that there is any essential
distinction between perceptual and inferential knowledge or, to put it differently, that
persons other than jurors can acquire perceptual knowledge; their "perceptual knowledge"
is always a mixture of direct and indirect knowledge. Thus Wigmore (7 WIGMORE
§ 1919): "[N]o such distinction [as thae\ betveen inference and 'original perception']
can scientifically [sic] be made, since the.prbcesses of knowledge and the sources of
illusion are the same for both." And so P~fbessor McCormick: "There is no conceiv-
able [sic] statement [of a witness], however specific, detailed and 'factual' that is not
in some measure the product of inference and reflection as well as observation and
memory." [McCormick, The Opinion Ride and Expert Testimony, 23 TEXAS L. REv.
109, 111 (1945). See also THAYER, PrEImiNARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 524 (1898);
MAGUIRE, EViDENcE-Co.mmON SENSE AND CoIm.MoN LAW 24 (1947).] And so able
and distinguished a judge as Learned Hand and so able and distinguished a court as
the Court of Appeals of the Second Circuit have said in the same context: "[O]ur
sense perceptions-even our most immediate sense impressions-are always 'conclusions'."
United States v. Petrone, 185 F.2d 334, 336 (2d Cir. 1950). This is all very strange
and, perhaps, attributable to the fact that all perceptual knowledge has an intellectual
component. See p. 373, infra. If so, the error is the failure to distinguish betveen an
idea and an inference.
23. All of the knowledge which may be judicially noticed is indirect except the
sort of knowledge which we call intellectual intuitions, that is, necessary general proposi-
tions which are self-evidently true and the truth of which is grasped immediately by
minds which understand the terms of such propositions. The fuller discussion of this
point must await a later article on judicial notice. The distinction between the direct
1952]
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knowledge of individual things or events or generalized knowledge of kinds
of things or events. Knowledge of the first sort consists of singular proposi-
tions24 and of the second sort, of general propositions ;25 and a jury must
possess knowledge of both sorts in order to decide a material issue. For
although a material issue always concerns a particular thing or event, although
it is always constituted of contradictory singular propositions, 20 a jury can
resolve such an issue only by means of inferential knowledge of the thing
or event which the issue concerns; and to achieve such knowledge it must
employ both singular and general propositions as premises. 27 While the
doctrine of judicial notice authorizes a jury to take cognizance of some
knowledge of particular things or events, the knowledge of that sort which
may be judicially noticed is so limited that there can rarely be a controversy
in which a jury will not find it necessary to acquire other knowledge of
that sort by observation; and the only knowledge of particular things and
events which it can properly acquire in that way is knowledge of evidence.
It is in this connection that the problems of real proof arise. The law
of evidence is in part concerned with the admission and exclusion of things
or events offered as evidence. What things and events does it permit liti-
gants to introduce as evidence? Of what things and events is a jury per-
mitted to acquire direct knowledge?
§ 3. The Nature of Evidence
As we use the word "evidence" only a thing or an event can be evidence,
but all things and events which a jury can know directly in any respect can
become evidence. 28  However, a particular thing or event which is in this
and the indiriect knowledge of witnesses is basic to the understanding of the traditional
distinction between "fact" and "opinion" which is drawn by the "opinion rule." The
discussion of this point must also await later articles on testimonial proof, although it
will be somewhat illuminated in the present article by analogous problems in real proof.
It must be kept in mind at all times that there is no difference whatever between the
processes by which jurors, and those by which witnesses, acquire knowledge, both direct
and indirect.
24. In TIF we called propositions which state knowledge of individual things or
events "elementary"; we have now decided to call them "singular," not only because
it is customary to do so but also because it describes their character more accurately.
25. For the nature of propositions and the distinction between singular and general
propositions see TIP, 1247. 1247 n.31, 1248, 1250, 1250 n.36, 1264.
26. A general proposition can never be a material proposition; and this for the
reason that the relationships between kinds or classes of things, events, or attributes
are never legally significant for a litigious controversy.
27. This follows from the rule of inference which regulates the proof of a singular
proposition. See TIP, 1270-74.
28. See TIF, 1265 et seq. For various definitions of "evidence," see 1 WxGMoiu § I
and 1 CHAMBERLAYNE §§ 4-7. Wigmore himself says that in "the process of presenting
evidence for the purpose of demonstrating an asserted fact . . . tie term Evidence
represents: Any knowable fact or group of facts, not a legal or a logical principle,
considered with a view to its being offered before a legal tribunal for the purpose of
producing a persuasion, positive or negative, on the part of the tribunal, as to the truth
of a proposition, not of law or of logic, on which the determination of the trihunal is
to be asked." This statement confuses facts and propositions, proof and persuasion,
and truth and probability.
[ VOL. 5
REAL PROOF
sense potentially an item of evidence may never become so actually. It may
never be offered as evidence or, if offered, may be excluded by the judge .-0
To become evidence, a thing or event must satisfy three conditions: first, it
must exist or occur in the presence of the jury ;30 second, it must be sensible
in some respect, that is, capable of being sensed or perceived in that respect
by the jury; and, third, it must be made sensibly apparent to the jury.31 In
our usage, therefore, evidence consists of things and events and only of
things and events which judges permit to be exhibited to juries so that the
latter can observethem.
32
We must now separate one kind of event from all other kinds of events,
and one kind of thing from all other kinds of things, which can be evidence.
The kind of event is the event of a person's reporting what purports to be
his knowledge; and the kind of thing is the document, a thing which states
what purports to be knowledge possessed by its author. 33  Such an event
can occur in or out of the presence of a jury; when it takes the form of a
witness' giving testimony we shall call it a "testimonial event." 34  Similarly,
such a thing can exist in or out of the presence of a jury. In these respects
an event of this sort is like all other events, and a thing of this sort is like
all other things, which can and do become evidence. But there is one respect
29. As we shall see, there is one sort of event which need not be offered and
cannot be excluded, namely, the behavior, voluntary and involuntary, of a witness while
giving his testimony. This is traditionally known as "demeanor evidence."
30. That does not mean that the thing or event must exist or occur in the court-
room; the jury may be taken to the thing or event so that they can "view" it. See
infra, p. 366, 366 n.66.
31. Of course, it will not be sensibly apparent to the jury although it exists or
occurs in the presence of the jury and is sensible, if it may not be observed by the jury
without the judge's permission and he will not permit the jury to observe it.
32. As we use the word, things include persons.
33. There are things, such as paper, wood and stone, upon which words and
sentences can be inscribed or otherwise impressed. What is inscribed or impressed
thereon may or may not be a report or record of what purports to be the knowledge of
him who has made the inscription or impression. If it is, we call the thing a document
and the maker of the inscription or impression the author of the document, whatever his
purpose in producing the document and although it may also include what does not purport
to be the author's knowledge. If nothing that is inscribed or impressed upon the thing
purports to be a report or record of knowledge or in so far as there is also inscribed
or impressed upon the thing what does not purport to be a report or record of knowledge,
we call the thing a writing or an instrument or by a similar name. That is to say that
in one aspect a thing may be a document and in another, a writing or instrument, or it
may be exclusively the one or the other.
34. If the event of a person's reporting what purports to be his knowledge does
not occur in the presence, not only of a jury but also of the very jury which is trying
the issue to which the knowledge which he has reported is relevant, the reporter is
known as an "extrajudicial declarant"; his report, as an "extrajudicial declaration"; and
the making of his report, as the "making of an extrajudicial declaration." The author of
a document is an extrajudicial declarant; in so far as a document states what purports to
be his knowledge it is one or more extrajudicial declarations; and the preparation of a
document is the making of an extrajudicial declaration. An extrajudicial declaration,
like testimony, is thus reported knowledge. While a jury can know a testimonial event
directly, it can know the making of an extrajudicial declaration only indirectly although,




in which they are unique: Such an event is the only sort of event which
involves, and such a thing is the only sort of thing which includes, what pur-
ports to be a report of knowledge. A jury, observing a testimonial event
by its sense of hearing or a document by its sense of vision, learns directly
what it is that a witness states, or the author of a document has stated, as
his knowledge,35 knowledge which, if it is genuinely such, the jury can
somehow use in deciding a material issue .3 But there is a special condition,
namely, the credibility of the witness or of the author, which must be satis-
fied if a jury is to infer that what either has stated to be the case is the case;
and this condition complicates enormously the inferential processes that a
testimonial event or a document can initiate.37 The nature of such an event
or thing and the complex character of the inferences which they make pos-
sible, distinguish them from all other events and things which juries can
know directly. It is possible, of course, that a testimonial event or a docu-
ment may be offered and admitted as evidence so that a jury can infer, not
that what the witness or author has stated to be the case is the case, but
that something else is the case; and in that event the testimonial event need
not be distinguished from other events, or the document from other things,
which a jury can know directly.
Traditionally, it is said that there are three kinds of evidence, real,
testimonial and circumstantial, but in our view there is only one kind of
evidence, although there are three kinds of evidential propositions 8 and three
kinds of proof. All evidence is "real" in the sense that every item of
evidence must exist or occur sensibly in the presence of a jury; and what is
traditionally called "real evidence" and what is traditionally called "testi-
monial evidence" are only two classes of things and events which can be
evidence and which can be distinguished from one another only by the differ-
ences in the inferences which they can respectively generate. In short, real
proof is different from testimonial proof, and it is this difference which
underlies the traditional distinction between real evidence and testimonial
evidence. In order to make this clearer, we must pass from an epistemic
to a logical analysis of the process by which a jury acquires direct knowledge
of evidence and of the inferences which such knowledge makes possible.
35. Provided, of course, that it is expressed in a language which the jury understands.
36. If the witness or author is truthful the knowledge which he reports is necessarily
his own, although it may be knowledge of the making and content of an extrajudicial
declaration. The hearsay rule and its exceptions are the legal conventions which de-
termine whether and how a jury may use an extrajudicial declaration inferentially.
37. This is equally true of every extrajudicial declaration.
38. By an evidential proposition we mean a singular proposition which is employed
in the proof of a probandum, that is, a proposition to be proved. As we shall see, the
three kinds of evidential propositions are propositions of real evidence, propositions of
testimonial evidence, and propositions of circumstantial evidence.
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§ 4. The Relation of Evidence to The Probative Process
Viewed logically, knowledge consists of propositions. Knowledge is
expressed in and communicated by language,3 9-more specifically by that
unit of language which is called a declarative sentence.40 Such a sentence
can express one or more items of knowledge, one or more propositions. A
proposition which is knowledge that we possess, is one that we can and do
assert. But we can construct declarative sentences which express what we
do not then know but can and may know. subsequently. Such sentences
express propositions which we cannot properly assert. Propositions are thus
either potential or actual knowledge; and since the assertion of a proposition
is the act of knowledge, the making of a judgment, we can properly assert
only those propositions which are our actual knowledge. In short, all propo-
sitions are assertible, but not all of them are assertible or can properly be
asserted by a particular person at a particular time. It should be apparent
at once that the knowledge needed by a jury to decide a material issue is a
proposition which it cannot properly assert at the beginning of the trial of
the issue. That is to say that the contradictory material propositions of
which such an issue is constituted are at the inception of a trial of the issue
the jury's potential and not its actual knowledge. The trial of the issue is
normally concluded by the jury's assertion of one of those propositions as
its answer to the issue.41 The question how the jury was enabled to assert
it and the question how a jury acquires the knowledge which it needs in
order to resolve a material issue, are the same question.
We shall be aided at this point by distinguishing kinds of propositions
according to the kinds of knowledge which they are. Knowledge, as we
have seen, is either about particular things or events or about kinds of things
or events. Propositions which are knowledge of the first sort are singular
propositions and those which are knowledge of the second sort are general
39. By language we here mean the notations of common speech which are called
words. We recognize, of course, that knowledge can be expressed by non-verbal nota-
tions, such as the symbols of mathematics, by gestures, such as semaphore signals, and
by other signs. For our purposes, however, it is sufficient to consider the words of a
common language, such as English, as a means of expressing knowledge.
40. Translation of a sentence from one langauge into another shows that the same
proposition can be expressed by different sentences; even in the same langauge two
different sets of words can sometimes be used to express the same proposition; and
a single sentence, if ambiguous, can be interpreted as expressing two or more propositions
alternatively. It thus appears that a sentence can be separated analytically from the
proposition which it expresses, even though it cannot be separated therefrom actually
without becoming a set of meaningless sounds or marks. But, as we have seen (supra,
note 39), propositions need not be expressed by sentences constituted by the words of an
ordinary language. Propositions are sometimes, therefore, actually as well as analytically
separable from ordinary verbal sentences.
41. The "mistrial," whether it occurs because of the inability of the jurors to agree
upon the correct answers to the issues submitted to them or for some other reason, may
be regarded as abnormal, since most trials by jury end in verdicts.
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propositions.42  Whether of the one or the other sort, knowledge is either
direct or indirect, either the result of intuition, sensitive or intellectual, or
the result of inference.4 3 Propositions which are direct knowledge are imme-
diate or indemonstrable; only those which are indirect knowledge are demon-
strable. An immediate proposition, whether singular or general, can be
asserted without proof or demonstration because it is knowledge which is
had directly. But unless it is assumed, a demonstrable proposition, whether
singular or general, 44 can be asserted only as the result of its proof. A
proposition which is a jury's direct. knowledge of an item of evidence is an
immediate singular proposition; hence, it can be and is asserted as the result
of perception and not of proof. A material proposition, on the other hand,
is always a demonstrable singular proposition which, if denied, a jury cannot
and may not assert unless it is proved. Every material proposition which
is denied therefore becomes an ultimate probandum. 45 And all propositions,
singular and general, which are employed in the proof of an ultimate pro-
bandum, except those which a jury may judicially notice or which are its
knowledge of evidence, are likewise demonstrable propositions which cannot
be asserted by a jury unless they are proved. They are intermediate pro-
banda and, if proved, knowledge which the jury acquires during the trial as
the result of their proof.
4 6
42. See notes 24, 25, supra. We call singular propositions propositions of fact
precisely because they are always about particular things or events. The subject of a
sentence which expresses a singular proposition is always a proper name or a definite
descriptive phrase which uniquely designates some particular, either a particular thing or
event or a particular attribute of a thing or event. We call such propositions singular to
distinguish them from general propositions which are about kinds of things, events, or
attributes rather than about any particular instance of a kind. The subject of a
sentence which expresses a general proposition is always a common name or an
indefinite descriptive phrase which connotes a kind or class of thing or event or attribute.
General propositions are not propositions of fact in the same sense as singular proposi-
tions; that is, they do not state knowledge about particular existences. But this does
not mean that general propositions have no reference to the world of actual existences.
On the contrary, general propositions are divided into two groups according as they state
knowledge of reality or knowledge of ideal or purely formal objects. All empirical
generalizations, in fact, all inductions from experience, are of the first sort. Being of
this sort, the general propositions that serve as evidential hypotheses in judicial proof
are factual in their ultimate origin and reference, even though they are not, like singular
propositions, propositions of particular fact. See TIF, 1250 n.38.
43. Singular propositions which are immediate are observations or sensitive intu-
itions, just as general propositions which are immediate are axioms or intellectual
intuitions. (See note 23, supra.) The immediacy of the knowledge is thus different in
the case of singular and in the case of general propositions; the former are evidcnt truths,
the latter are self-evident; but all immediate propositions are alike in that they are all
essentially indemonstrable. Demonstrable singular and demonstrable general propositions
are alike in that both state the results, potential of actual, or inference, although they arc
distinguishable by the types of inferences by which they are demonstrable.
44. Strictly speaking, axioms, that is, self-evident general propositions, cannot be
assumed, since only demonstrable propositions need to be or can be assumed although, as
assumed, they are asserted without being demonstrated. But the doctrine of judicial
notice does not distinguish between immediate and demonstrable general propositions;
it comprehends both.
45. By an ultimate probandum we mean a material proposition which has been
denied and is therefore in dispute.
46. By an intermediate probandum we mean any other proposition, singular or general,
than an ultimate probandum, which cannot be asserted unless it is proved.
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The acquisition of knowledge indirectly by inference is logically analyzed
in terms of the nature of the step of proof as the result of which the proposi-
tion which is that knowledge is asserted. A proposition is proved when it
must be asserted as the result of the assertion of other propositions. Proof
is thus a psychological process consisting of acts of assertion.47 It is valid
or invalid according as it does or does not conform to the rule of logic which
states the conditions under which a proposition, having a certain form, can
be asserted if other propositions, having certain forms, are asserted. It is
clear that no proposition can be proved unless some propositions can be
asserted without proof, either because they are immediate or because, though
demonstrable, they are assumed. We had this point in mind when we said
that a jury cannot acquire knowledge by inference unless it possesses or
acquires some knowledge without inference. The knowledge of which it
takes judicial notice and the knowledge which it acquires by the perception
of evidence is knowledge which it has or acquires without inference; from
these two sorts of knowledge, it acquires by inference other knowledge which
can be asserted as the result of proof.
We can now return to the traditional distinction between real and testi-
monial evidence. The knowledge which a jury acquires when it hears what
a witness states or reads what the author of a document has stated as his
knowledge, is of precisely the same sort as that which it obtains when it
observes either any other aspect of a document or testimonial event, or a
thing or event of any other sort. In each instance it is the jury's perceptual
knowledge; and this identity reflects the sense in which, as we have said, all
evidence is "real." We shall therefore give the name "propositions of real
evidence" to all propositions which are a jury's perceptual knowledge of
evidence. All propositions of real evidence are alike in that all of them are
immediate and singular. They differ only in that those which are a jury's
direct knowledge of a report of knowledge by a document or a witness,
unlike those which are its direct knowledge of other things and events, them-
selves contain propositions, the propositions which are the knowledge which
the author of the document or the witness claims to possess. This difference
is recognized by the distinction between simple and compound singular
propositions. It can be simply expressed as follows: If simple, a proposi-
tion of real evidence is of the form "This (thing or event) appears to the
jury to be such and such"; if compound, it is of the form "This (document
or witness) appears to the jury to state that such and such is the case." 48
The presence of the word "appears" in both of these formulae indicates that
47. See TIF, 1271-73.
48. The words "such and such is the case" here stand for any possible proposition
which a witness or document can report, without distinction as to its being singular or
general, simple or compound, immediate or demonstrable.
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all propositions of those forms are immediate, that they are perceptual knowl-
edge; we shall subsequently state its significance more fully. If a singular
proposition is demonstrable it will contain the word "is" instead of the word
"appears," whether it is simple or compound; we shall subsequently discuss
the meaning of "is" in relation to the meaning of "appears."
While in our view there is only one kind of evidence there are three
kinds of proof, real, circumstantial and testimonial; and we must now
distinguish them from one another.
(1) A step of real proof is always an inference from knowledge of
what appears to be the case in some respect to knowledge of what is actually
the case in that same respect. If the proposition of real evidence employed
as a probans49 in a real inference is a simple proposition, the step is the
transition from the assertion of a proposition of the form "This appears to
the jury to be such and such" to the assertion of a proposition of the form
"This is such and such." 50  But if it is a compound proposition, the step is
the transition from the assertion of a proposition of the form "This (docu-
ment or witness) appears to the jury to state that such and such is the case"
to the assertion of a proposition of the form "This (document or witness)
does state that such and such is the case." In short, the conclusion, the
proximate probandum, of a step of real proof is itself a simple or a compound
proposition according as the proposition of real evidence employed as a
probans in that step is simple or compound.
(2) A step of testimonial proof is always the inference that what a
document5 ' or witness has stated to be the case is the case. Having inferred
in a step of real proof that a document or witness states that something is
the case, a jury then infers that what the document or witness has stated
to be the case is the case. We shall give the name "propositions of testi-
monial evidence" to all propositions which are a jury's indirect knowledge of
a statement by a document or a witness that something is the case. All
propositions of testimonial evidence are thus demonstrable, compound,
singular propositions of the form "This (document or witness) states that
such and such is the case"; and a step of testimonial proof is always the
transition from the assertion of a proposition of that form to the assertion
of the proposition of the form "Such and such is the case" which is con-
49. The word "probans" should be contrasted with the word "probandum." Just
as we use the latter to mean a proposition to be proved, either intermediately or ulti-
mately, so we use the former to mean a proving proposition, a premise. If singular, a
probans is an evidential proposition and, if general, an evidential hypothesis. See infra,
p. 359.
50. For a general discussion of the formal conditions of the validity of any step of
proof, see TIF, 1271 et seq.
51. Strictly, of course, the inference is that what the author of the document has
stated to be the case is the case.
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tained in the proposition ol testimonial evidence employed as a probans in
that step. 2
(3) A step of circumstantial proof is always an inference from knowl-
edge that something is the case to knowledge that something else is also the
case. Having observed or inferred or judicially noticed what is the case in
some respect, a jury then infers what is the case in some other respect. This,
we hope, makes it clear that any sirigular proposition, whether immediate
or demonstrable, whether simple or compound, can be employed asa probans
in a circumstantial inference. Thus, propositions of real and of testimonial
evidence can be so employed. From a jury's direct knowledge of what
appears to it to be the case in some respect, the jury may infer, not that 'it
is the case, but that something else is the case. Similarly, from a jury's
indirect knowledge that a document or witness states that something is the
case, the jury may infer not that what the document or witness has stated to
be the case is the case, but that something else is the case.5 3 However, we
shall reserve the name "propositions of circumstantial evidence" for demon-
strable, simple, singular propositions of the form "This is such and such."
We do so because, typically, the step of circumstantial proof is the transition
from the assertion of a proposition of that form to the assertion of a proposi-
tion of the same form but of different content "This is so and so."
A number of important analytical points can be seen as soon as the
nature of real, of testimonial, and of circumstantial proof, and the distinc-
tions among them, are understood.
(1) It has been said by Wigmore that there is real evidence but no real
proof, that is, no characteristic step or proof in which a proposition of real
evidence is employed probatively.54 To defend this position, one would have
to maintain that things are always precisely as they appear to be, in which
52. See note 48, supra. A more refined analysis of testimonial proof reveals that
it involves not one but two inferences, first, the inference that what a witness or the
author of a document has stated as his knowledge is his knowledge, namely, that such
and such is the case, and, second, the inference that what he knows to be the case is
the case. There are problems of testimonial proof which can be understood and solved
only by means of this more subtle analysis, but it is unnecessary to use it in order to
differentiate testimonial proof from real proof.
53. This use of a proposition of testimonial evidence is sometimes referred to as
"the circumstantial use of words."
54. In 1 WIGMORE § 24 it is said: "With reference to this mode of producing persua-
sion no question of relevancy arises. 'Res ipsa loquitur.' The thing proves or disproves
itself. No logical process is employed; only an act of sensible apprehension occurs....
Bringing a knife into Court ... is not giving evidence in the sense that it is asking the
Court to perform a process of inference ... ." But in 4 WIGMOnE § 1159, the matter
is put in this way: "It is unnecessary, for present purposes, to ask whether this is not,
after all, a third source of inference, i.e. an inference from the impressions or perceptions
of the tribunal to the objective existence of the thing perceived. The law does not need
to consider theories of psychology as to the subjectivity of knowledge or the mediateness
of perception. It assumes the objectivity of external nature; and, for the purposes of
judicial investigation, a thing perceived by the tribunal as existing does exist." (See also
1 WramoR § 24, n.4.)
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case, of course, there would be no distinction between a proposition of
real evidence and its proximate probandum.5 Moreover, the position implies
that there are material issues which a jury can answer by its perceptual
knowledge of evidence, which in turn implies that there are material proposi-
tions which are not probanda, even though they are denied, but rather imme-
diate singular and, hence, indemonstrable propositions. The incorrectness
of this position is shown by the following test: Is a proposition of the form
"This appears to the jury to be such and such" ever material? Or are not
all material propositions demonstrable, elementary propositions of the form
"This is such and such"? We think that it will be apparent that the first
of these questions must be answered in the negative, and the second, in the
affirmative. It follows, of course, that there must be real proof, 0
(2) If the proximate probandum of a step of real proof is a material
proposition it is also an ultimate probandum. But if it is an immaterial
proposition, as it usually is, the jury will have to perform at least one
further inference in order to achieve the knowledge required to answer a
material issue. A series of inferences is constructed logically as a line of
proof constituted of two or more steps of proof arranged in such a sequence
that the proximate probandum of each step is employed as a probans in the
next succeeding step, until an ultimate probandum is reached.r A line of
proof, however, must have its ultimate probantia, propositions the assertion
of which is not conditioned upon their proof, as well as its ultimate pro-
bandum. Only propositions of real evidence and propositions, both singular
and general, which may be judicially noticed, can be ultimate probantia;
and they have that status in the steps and lines of proof in which they occur.
But a line of proof must contain at least one proposition which is neither
an ultimate probans nor an ultimate probandum, at least one proposition
which must be proved by a prior step of proof so that it may be employed
probatively in the following step. We shall speak of such propositions as
55. By a proximate probandum we mean the conclusion of a step of proof of any
sort. If the proximate probandum of a step of proof is a material proposition, it is also
an ultimate probandum; otherwise it is an intermediate probandum and probans. As a
probans, it is either a proposition of testimonial evidence or a proposition of circumstantial
evidence.
56. Subsequent analysis of the proposition of real evidence will make clear why it
is impossible for such a proposition to be a material proposition.
57. The structure of a line of proof may be much more complicated than we have
indicated in the text. There may be secondary collateral lines of proof which converge
upon intermediate probanda in the principal line, and there may also be other subordinate
collateral lines of proof which converge upon intermediate probanda in the secondary
lines. For example, one of the evidential propositions in a step of testimonial proof is
the proposition "The witness is credible." But this is a demonstrable proposition which
may never be judicially noticed and is never an ultimate probandum; consequently, it is
an intermediate probandum. It can be proved only by proving a series of demonstrable
elementary propositions, one of which is "The witness is veracious." This proposition
in turn can be proved in different ways. Moreover, there may be more than one
intermediate probandum in any line of proof, principal or subordinate. For a fuller
discussion of these matters, see TIF, 1478-80 and 1479 n.12.
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intermediate probanda and probantia. An intermediate probandum and
probans may be either a singular or a general proposition; if singular, as a
probans it is either a proposition of testimonial evidence or a proposition of
circumstantial evidence.
As we shall see, no probandun can be proved by a single probans. If
a probandum is a singular proposition, it can be proved only by a conjunction
of at least two probantia of which all except one must be singular proposi-
tions and that one, a general proposition. We shall sometimes speak of
singular propositions employed as probantia as "evidential propositions";
an evidential proposition must be a proposition of real, or of testimonial, or
of circumstantial evidence. And we shall refer to general propositions
employed as probantia as "evidential hypotheses," and we shall discriminate
among those which are so employed in real, in testimonial, and in circum-
stantial proof. The general propositions employed as evidential hypotheses
in real and in testimonial proof may always be judicially noticed; they are
always ultimate probantia. But not all of those so employed in circumstan-
tial proof may be judicially noticed; those which may be, are ultimate pro-
bantia, but those which may not be, are intermediate probanda and probantia.
A step of proof can initiate a line of proof only if its probantia axe
immediate propositions or, if demonstrable propositions, need not be proved,
either because they may be judicially noticed or are conceded. That is to
say that a step of proof can initiate a line of proof only if its probantia are
ultimate probantia. This holds for a step of real proof as well as for steps
of testimonial and of circumstantial proof.
§ 5. The Conditions of Admissibility of Real Proof
In summary fashion we have now defined evidence as things and events
which with judicial permission are exhibited to a jury so that the jurors
can know them directlyp5 and we have distinguished propositions of real,
of testimonial, and of circumstantial evidence and the characteristically differ-
ent steps of proof in which they are respectively employed as evidential propo-
sitions.5 9 While our analysis has revealed that both' propositions of real
58. A jury can acquire direct knowledge only of sensible things and events and of
the sensible qualities of things and events. Although a thing or event becomes evidence
and is observed by a jury, the jury can acquire only indirect knowledge of its non-sensible
qualities. And if a thing or event does not become evidence, the jury can acquire only
indirect knowledge of its qualities, even of the sensible ones.
59. We hope that it is now clear that the primitive terms in our analysis are "evi-
dence" and "proposition." We have studiously avoided speaking of facts either as the end
or as the means of proof. We have done so because of the ambiguity of the word in legal
usage and because if by a fact is meant something that is actually the case, a fact
cannot be proved, nor can it be used in proving another fact. In this sense, a fact is
an object of knowledge. We cannot separate our knowledge about a fact from the
proposition which is our knowledge about it. Nor can we separate a proposition of fact
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evidence and propositions of testimonial evidence can be employed as evi-
dential propositions in steps of circumstantial proof, it has also disclosed
that steps of real, of testimonial, and of circumstantial proof are irreducibly
different and cannot be confused with one another. We are thus enabled to
see the problems of real proof in their proper setting among all the problems
of judicial proof. What we have defined as evidence and real proof occur
in the researches of the historian, in the laboratory investigations and field
work of the natural or the social scientist, and in the cognitive processes of
everyday life by which men acquire knowledge of their environments, as
well as in trials of material issues by legal tribunals.60 But we are concerned
with the problems of evidence and real proof as legal problems; we are
undertaking epistemic and logical analyses of. the former in an effort to
clarify and solve the latter. As legal problems, the problems of evidence
and real proof can be formulated only by reference to the legal aspect of
a trial.
In largest part, the law of evidence is concerned with the admission
and exclusion of things and events offered as evidence and of propositions
offered as evidential propositions and evidential hypotheses. The most
general principles of the law of evidence can be simply stated :01 (1) A
proposition offered as a probans is inadmissible unless it is directly or
indirectly relevant to an ultimate probandum. (2) Although a proposition
offered as a probans is directly or indirectly relevant to an ultimate pro-
bandum, it is nevertheless inadmissible if the negative value of its use in
from the fact of which it is knowledge; that separation can be achieved only analytically
by the recognition that a proposition can be true or false and that what is reported by
a false proposition of fact is not a fact. A fact can therefore be defined as that which is
reported by a singular proposition which is true in the sense that what it states to be the
case is actually the case. It is thus clear that for every pair of contradictory proposi-
tions about a matter of fact, that is, for every pair of contradictory singular propositions,
there is only one fact, namely, whatever is actually the case. A fact in this sense can no
more be "stated" in a pleading than proved. To state a fact is to allege a singular propo-
sition as the answer to a material issue and to claim that it ought to be so asserted by the
tribunal. For a fuller discussion of the distinction between fact and proposition, see TIF,
1248-51.
60. All our knowledge of matters of fact, of particular things and events, in whatever
field of cognitive activity, must start with "real evidence" ano must involve real proof,
although these technical 'phrases have an exclusively legal usage. For a discussion
of the problems of "real evidence" and "real proof" in general epistemology, and as
concerned primarily with scientific investigations, see C. I. LEwIs, MIND AND THE WORLD
ORDER, cc. 9, 10 (1929), and R. F. A. HOERNLE, STUDIES IN CONTEMPORARY META-
PHYSICS, cc. 4, 5 (1920) ; and for a discussion of them in historical research, see C. V.
LANGLOIS AND C. SEIGNEBOS, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF HISTORY, bk. II, c. 1
(1912).
61. Cf. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 264-65, 266 (1898): "Ob-
serve, at this point, one or two fundamental conceptions. There is a principle ... which
forbids receiving anything irrelevant, not logically probative .... There is another precept
which should be laid down as preliminary, in stating the law of evidence; namely, that
unless excluded by some rule or principle of law, all that is logically probative is ad-
missible .... Some things are rejected as being of too slight significance, or as having
too conjectural and remote a connection; others, as beirig dangerous, in their effect on
the jury, and likely to be misused or overestimated by that body; others, as being
impolitic, or unsafe on public grounds. . . ." And see 1 WIGMORE §§ 9-10.
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the probative process exceeds the positive value. The various specific
exclusionary rules of the law of evidence, such as the character rule, the
opinion rule and the hearsay rule, are applications of the second of these
principles; they are determinations that the disadvantages of admitting the
sorts of "evidence" which they exclude, exceed the advantages. The advan-
tages or positive value of admitting a proposition offered as a probans must
be understood in terms of its probative force and the need for employing
it probatively. It must suffice at this point to say that the probative force
of a probans is measured by its effect upon the probability of the ultimate
probandum to which it is relevant, and that that depends upon two factors,
first, its own assertoric value, that is, whether it can be asserted as true or,
if only as probable, the degree of probability which it can be asserted to
possess, and, second, upon the prior probability of which its ultimate pro-
bandum, that is, the degree of probability which its ultimate probandum
can be asserted to possess, prior to this instance of its proof. The need
for using a proposition as a probans depends upon the feasibility of proving
the ultimate probandum to which it is relevant by other proofs and upon
their probative force. The disadvantages or negative value of admitting
a proposition as a probans must be understood in terms either of the
likelihood that its use in the probative process will result in worse rather
than in better answers to material issues or of the probable adverse effect
of admitting propositions of that sort upon certain political and social interests
which it is the policy of procedural law to protect.
None of the specific exclusionary rules of the law of evidence, such as
those which we have mentioned, applies to real proof; they apply only to
testimonial or to circumstantial proof. It will be remembered that a thing
or event is always offered so that a jury can know it directly and use its
direct knowledge of the thing or event in a real inference. Consequently,
as we have said, to offer a thing or event as evidence is necessarily to offer
one or more propositions of real evidence and one or more steps of real
proof; and they will necessarily be admitted or excluded according as the
thing or event is admitted or excluded. An event always involves a thing,
and a thing is sensible in different respects. It has sensible qualities and
it is itself sensible, that is, it can appear to be a thing of a certain sort. It
follows that a thing or event may be offered so that a jury can observe one
or more of its sensible qualities, or the sort of thing or event it apparently is,
or for both purposes. We shall call the purpose for which a thing or event
is offered "the perceptual purpose of the offer." The condition of admissi-
bility which is peculiar to real proof is the condition that a jury shall be able
to accomplish the preceptual purpose of the offer of a thifig or event, that it
shall be able to make the observations which the offer contemplates; we shall
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call this condition of admissibility "the epistemic condition" of the admissi-
bility of real proof. We do so, because it is concerned with capacity of men like
jurors, untrained observers of normal sensitive powers and common expe-
rience, to acquire perceptual knowledge under the observational conditions
furnished by a trial.
For the rest, the admissibility of things and events, of propositions of
real evidence and of steps of real proof, is regulated by the two principles
which we have characterized as the most general principles of the law of
evidence and which are, perhaps, more often and more crucially applicable
to testimonial and circumstantial proof, especially the second of them. The
first of them imposes upon real proof the condition that, to be admissible, a
proposition of real evidence shall be directly or indirectly relevant to an
ultimate probandum.62  We shall call this condition "the logical condition"
of the admissibility of real proof. As we shall see, the satisfaction of this
condition depends upon the identification of the offered thing or event with
one of the litigants in some way, and, if the proximate probandum of the
offered step of real proof is not an ultimate probandum, upon the admissi-
bility of the necessary subsequent steps in the line of proof which it would
initiate. The second of these principles is concerned with preventing such
litigious disadvantages as the undue prolongation of trials, unfair surprise,
confusion of issues and undue prejudice. It imposes upon real proof the
condition that the advantages of admitting a thing or event and the step of
real proof which would be generated thereby shall exceed the disadvantages.
Since these advantages and disadvantages are practical ones, we shall speak
of this condition as "the practical condition" of the admissibility of real proof.
The problems of real proof focus ultimately upon the probative force of
steps of real proof in relation both to their proximate probanda and to the
ultimate probanda of lines of proof of which they are elements. But we
think that we have now made it clear that the central as well as the peculiar
problem of real proof is what kinds of things and events may be exhibited
to juries so that they can know them directly. The solution of this problem
in its various manifestations depends primarily upon an epistemic analysis,
an analysis of the nature of perceptual knowledge and of the capacity to
acquire it of the sort of men that jurors are. But we shall find it necessary
to resort also to logical analysis in order to discover the nature of proposi-
62. The inferential relationship is transitive, by which is meant that if P and Q,
any two propositions, prove R, and if R and S prove T, then P, which is conditionally
probative of R, is also conditionally probative of T. This explains the distinction
between direct and indirect proof and between direct and indirect relevancy. One
proposition is relevant to another if it is capable of being employed in the proof of that
other; it is directly relevant to its proximate probandum but only indirectly relevant
to a more remote probandum in the same line of proof. Thus, in the case that we put
above, P is relevant to both R and T; it is directly relevant to R and indirectly relevant
to T. See TIF, 1275, 1277-79.
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tions which are perceptual- knowledge and of the inferences which they make
possible. However, the logical analysis will be found to be related to the
epistemic, as the examination of the forms of propositions and of proofs is
related to the examination of their matter. We are primarily concerned to
know what is the content of propositions which are perceptual knowledge and
how the probative force of real proof is affected by variations in their content
and in the conditions under which such knowledge is obtained. Knowing
this, we should be able to say what the rules governing the admissibility of
real proof ought to be and to criticize them as they are.
As we have said, we cannot separate our analysis of propositions of
real evidence from a consideration of the kinds of things and events which
juries can know directly. Nor can we separate it, either from our analysis
of the steps of real proof in which such propositions are employed as pro-
bantia, or from our analysis of the steps of testimonial and circumstantial
proof with which steps of real proof must so often be associated. It is only
by such an integrated view of the matter that we can understand the problems
which arise when things and events are offered as evidence. These problems
are defined by what we have called the epistemic, the logical, and the practical
conditions of admissibility. Those involved in the administration of the
epistemic condition of admissibility and, to a lesser extent, those involved
in the administration of the logical condition, range from very simple ones,
which the courts appear to decide uniformly, to very complicated ones, which
they decide differently because the principles which so perfectly fit and so
conclusively solve the simple problems are inadequate for the solution of the
complicated ones. It is at this point that our analysis must become more
subtle, both in order to understand the problems and in order to solve them.
We recognize, of course, that an analysis which is adequate for the first of
these purposes may be inadequate for the second, and that the most difficult
legal problems are precisely those which most urgently require and most
insistently demand the exercise of judicial discretion. But discretion should
not be blind or capricious; it should be guided by principles: It is that good
judgment which men must use in order to solve particular practical problems
in the light of principles which apply equally but not with equal clarity to
all problems of the same sort.
63
This insight requires us to present an account of the problems of real
proof in such a way that the analytical principles which are adequate for
the solution of the simple problems are first expounded. But the simple
ones are not all of the same sort. We shall find that there are three types
of real proof, each With its simple problems for the solution of which the
63. See AIMSOTLE, NIcMACHA'x ErHics, bk. VI, c. 11.
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analysis of that type is adequate, and each with its difficult problems to which
the principles developed by the analysis must be applied with discretion.
In addition, the three types of real proof are themselves in an order of diffi-
culty and complexity, so that the analysis which is sufficient for the simple
cases of the first type must be extended and deepened in order to make it
adequate for even the simple cases of the second type, and made even more
subtle in order to make it adequate for those of the third type. We shall,
therefore, first analyze the three types of real proof in the order of their
difficulty and complexity; we shall then consider the conditions of admissi-
bility of each type. In this part of our enterprise, we shall endeavor to
discover the principles that render the simple problems of each type intelli-
gible and soluble, before introducing the more difficult ones with respect to
which our analytical task is precisely to indicate why they are difficult and
why, therefore, their solution requires the exercise of judicial discretion.
The following brief outline of the subsequent parts of this essay will
serve to notify our readers of the nature of the topics which we shall discuss
and of the order in which we shall discuss them.
II. Types of Real Proof.
A. Real Proof of The First Type: The Wholly Sensible Quality.
B. Real Proof of The Second Type: The Sensible Object.
C. Real Proof of The Third Type: The Ambiguous Characteristic.
III. The Conditions of Admissibility of Real Proof.
A. The Epistemic Condition: In the first type of real proof the diffi-
cult cases are those which involve degrees of sensible qualities;
in the second type, the difficult cases are those which turn upon
the question what kinds of things are "common sensible objects";
in the third type, even the simple cases are difficult because the
ambiguous characteristic involves both sensible and non-sensible
elements.
B. The Logical Condition: The satisfaction of this condition depends
upon the identification of the thing and, if the proximate pro-
bandum of the step of real proof is not an ultimate probandum,
upon the admissibility of the necessary subsequent steps of testi-
monial and of circumstantial proof.
C. The Practical Condition: It is of the nature of this condition that
its administration involves the exercise of judicial discretion. Do
the courts exercise their discretion prudently?
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IV. Probative Force and Opposition: The major problems are how the
probative force of a step of real proof in relation both to its proximate
probandum and to its ultimate probandum is calculated, and whether
or not real proof can be opposed and, if so, in what ways.
V. Special Cases of Real Proof.
A. Documents: The chief problems are those created by the necessity
of "authentication" and the "best evidence rule."
B. Demonstrations and Experiments: An event, as well as a thing,
can be exhibited to a jury so that the jury can know it directly,
but the offer of an event creates special problems. For that
reason, in parts II - IV of this essay we shall generally restrict
our analysis to cases in which things rather than events are offered.
Demonstrations and experiments are kinds of events; the primary
question involved in the offer of an event of either sort is what
the proponent is seeking to prove.
C. Demeanor Evidence: Demeanor, whether that of a witness while
testifying or of a person who is not giving testimony, is not only
a kind of event, but a kind which always occurs in the presence
of a jury and is sensibly apparent to it. Consequently, such an
event need not be offered and cannot be excluded. The chief
problem, therefore, is judicial control of the inferences from such
evidence and the estimation of their probative force.
VI. Summary and Conclusions.
It will not always be possible to keep to this order of parts or to stay
entirely within the domain of each part during the course of its develop-
ment, since to some extent the various parts overlap one another. And
because of limitations of space, we shall have to confine the remainder of
this installment to Part II A: Real Proof of The First Type.
II. THE TYPES OF REAL PROOF
We have defined evidence as the class of things and events6 4 which with
judicial permission are exhibited to juries so that they can know them
directly. Before a thing can become an item of evidence it must be offered
as such by a litigant; it becomes an item of evidence only if admitted by
64. We remind the reader that by a "thing" we always mean a physical thing, and
that in this Part of this essay we shall, in general, restrict our analysis to cases in
which the evidence consisted of things rather than of events.
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the judge0  An offer may take the form of a request by a litigant that the
jury be permitted to leave the courtroom in order to perceive or, as is tradi-
tionally said, to "view" some thing which cannot conveniently be brought
there. We shall, however, ignore this special case in which, instead of
bringing a thing to a jury, a litigant asks that the jury be taken to the thing.6
We have seen that a thing is necessarily a sensible thing and that it is
sensible in two different respects. The first and essentially primary respect
is that it has sensible qualities; the second and essentially derivative respect
is that it is a sensible object, an object of sensitive knowledge. While its
being as a sensible object depends upon its possession of sensible qualities,
we shall see67 that it is not reducible to a were sumanation of them. It is
because a thing is sensible in these two respects that it can be offered so
that a jury can observe one or more of its sensible qualities or so that a
jury can observe the thing as a sensible object. The difference between
these two perceptual purposes makes the distinction between wbat we shall
call "real proof of the first type" and "real proof of the second type." The
first occurs when a thing is admitted so that a jury can observe one or more
of its sensible qualities, such as its color; and the second, when it is admitted
65. The only exception is so-called demeanor evidence which, as we shall see, need
not be offered and may not be excluded, although a jury can be instructed to ignore their
knowledge of it. Cf. Frank, J., in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant
Corporation, 175 F.2d 77, 80 (2d Cir. 1949) : ". . . the demeanor of an orally-testifying
witness is 'always assumed to be in evidence,'" citing 3 Wicmsoam § 949. See note 29,
sut pra.
66. Things are exhibited to juries so that juries call know either the things as
sensible objects or their sensible qualities directly, and use their direct knowledge,
formulated by propositions of real evidence, in making real inferences. And, according
to some courts, this is so, whether a thing is brought to a jury or the jury is taken
to the thing. [For an example of cases so holding, see Carpenter v. Carpenter, 78 N.H.
440, 101 AtI. 628, L.R.A. 1917F 974 (1917).] But, for reasons stated in the Carpenter
case, in Close v. Samm, 27 Iowa 503 (1869), and in WIXXiom § 1168, other courts take
the position that the purpose of a view "is not to make [jurors] silent witnesses in the
case, burdened with testimony unknown to both parties," but to enable them the better
to understand and the more intelligently to apply the testimony of the witnesses regarding
the thing "viewed" by them. [See, for example, Close v. Samm, supra; Huyink v.
Hart Publications, Inc., 212 Minn. 87, 2 N.W.2d 552 (1942) ; Ball v. Twin City Motor
Bus Co., 225 Minn. 274, 30 N.W.2d 523 (1948) ; State v. Merritt, 212 P.2d 706 (Nev.
1949) ; State v. McVeigh, 35 Wash.2d 493, 214 P.2d 165 (1950).] As the court said
in the Carpenter case, supra at 445, 101 Atl. at 631, this is nonsense, or, as the court
said in Carter v. Parsons, 136 Neb. 515, 519, 286 N.W. 696, 698 (1939), a "psycho-
logical fiction." Obviously, an "intelligent application" of a jury's perceptual knowl-
edge of a thing to the testimony of witnesses reporting opposite observations, is to
reject it as incredible; and that is precisely the "intelligent manner" in which the
jurors applied their perceptual knowledge in, for example, Close v. Samm, supra. As
the court also said in the Carpenter case, "If the object is black when seen by the
jury it would be absurd to expect them to find [that is, to infer) that it was white,
in the absence of evidence indicating that they had been imposed upon." 78 N.H. at
447, 101 Atl. at 631. See also Bancroft Realty Co. v. Alencewicz, 7 N.J. Super. 105,
110, 72 A.2d 360, 362-63 (1950), in which the court, quoting from Hinners v. Edge-
water & Ft. Lee R.R., 75 N.J.L. 514, 519, 69 Atl. 161, 163 (1908), said that "as
to some testimony ...to understand it is to discredit it, while, as to other testimony
to understand it is to accept it even in the face of contradiction or denial."
67. In Part II B.
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so that the jury can observe it as the sort of thing it apparently is, as salt,6 8
for example, or as glass, 9 or as whiskey,
70 or as a shingle,71 or as blood.72
But a thing also 'has qualities other than its sensible ones. It has qualities
which are wholly non-sensible and which, therefore, can be known only
indirectly; and it has complex qualities which are constituted of a combina-
tion of sensible and non-sensible qualities and which, therefore, are partially
sensible and partially non-sensible. We shall call such complex qualities
"ambiguous" characteristics. Their ambiguity consists in their being like
qualities which are wholly sensible in that they, too, are attributes of things
and not things, and in their being like things in that their complexity includes
both sensible and non-sensible qualities. Race 73 and age74 are ambiguous
characteristics of human beings; decay is an ambiguous characteristic of
iron and wood.7 5 A thing can be offered, therefore, so that a jury can
observe those of its sensible qualities which are elements of one of its
ambiguous characteristics and then infer that it has that characteristic. The
difference between the first two purposes and this third purpose for which
a thing can be offered makes the distinction between real proof of the first
and second types and what we shall call "real proof of the third type. '7 6
68. Martin v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 133 Kan. 124, 299 Pac. 261 (1931).
69. Manuta v. Lazarus, 104 Misc. 134, 171 N.Y. Supp. 1076 (City Ct. 1918).
70. Enyart v. People, 70 Colo. 362, 201 Pac. 564 (1921).
71. Morton v. Fairbanks, 11 Pick. (28 Mass.) 368 (1831).
72. People v. Fernandez, 35 N.Y. 49 (1806).
73. Hook v. Pagee, 2 Munf. (16 Va.) 379 (1811); Hudgins v. Wrights, 1 Hen.
& M. (11 Va.) 134 (1806). In the latter case one of the judges said: "The distinguish-
ing characteristics of the different species of the human race are so visibly marked, that
those species may be readily discriminated from each other by mere inspection only.
This, at least, is emphatically true in relation to the negroes, to the Indians of North
America, and the European white people." Id. at 141.
74. Schnoor v. Meinicke, 40 N.W.2d 803 (N.D. 1950) ; cf. People v. Kielczewski,
269 Ill. 293, 109 N.E. 981 (1915).
75. Stewart v. Everts, 76 Wis. 35, 44 N.W. 1092 (1890); Walker v. Ontario,
118 Wis. 564, 95 N.W. 1086 (1903).
76. In State v. Linkhow, 69 N.C. 214, 215 (1873), defendant was charged with
singing a hymn in such a manner as to disturb a religious congregation. A witness
who was asked to describe his singing "imitated it by singing a verse in the voice and
manner of defendant, 'which produced a burst of prolonged and irresistible laughter,
convulsing alike the spectators, the Bar, the jury and the Court.'" In Berbarry v.
Tombacher, 162 N.C. 497, 499, 77 S.E. 412, 413 (1913), there was some controversy
as to whether plaintiff bought from defendant cassimere or serge or cotton suits.
Plaintiff was permitted to exhibit to the jury suits of the three kinds, "and to show
the difference in quality." The court held that this was "merely to illustrate the
difference in texture and quality of different sorts" and that it was competent for that
purpose. In the first of these cases, therefore, a series of events was admitted in lieu
of a verbal description by the witness of defendant's conduct; and in the second, things
were admitted in order to supplement the witness' description of them. But the result
was real proof either of the first or of the second type. That is to say that the offer
of a thing or event in lieu of or to supplement a verbal description is an offer of the
thing or event so that a jury can observe one or more of its sensible qualities or the
thing itself as a sensible object. But in such cases and only in such cases it makes sense
to say that the purpose of exhibiting a thing or event to a jury is to enable it the
better to understand and the more intelligently to apply the testimony of the witnesses,
See note 66, supra,
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We shall subsequently see that the admissibility of a thing depends in
the first instance upon the perceptual purpose for which it is offered; the
condition of admissibility which we have called the epistemic condition is
that a jury shall be able to accomplish the specific perceptual purpose for
which a thing is offered. But we are now concerned, not with problems of
admissibility, but with differences in the types of real proof which occur
when things are admitted for different perceptual purposes. In what follows
we shall therefore assume that whatever the perceptual purpose for which
a thing was offered, it was admissible; and we shall distinguish among
perceptual purposes only for the sake of analyzing the different types of
real proof. The reader must be reminded that whatever the perceptual
purpose for which a thing is offered, to admit the thing for that purpose is
necessarily to admit a proposition of real evidence, an immediate singular
proposition which is the jury's direct knowledge of the thing, and which is
of the form "This appears to the jury to be such and such."7 7 But "such
and such" in this formula can, as we have just seen, refer either to a kind
of sensible quality or to a kind of sensible object. There are thus variants
of this form.
A. Real Proof of The First Type: The Wholly Sensible Quality
Real proof of this type occurs when a thing78 is admitted so that a jury
can observe a sensible quality of the thing. It is clear that a quality of a
thing cannot be offered or admitted independently of the thing which it
qualifies. Only a thing can be offered or admitted, although it can be offered
and admitted for different perceptual purposes. It necessarily follows that
a jury's direct knowledge of a sensible quality of a thing is not separable
actually from its direct knowledge of a thing as a sensible object. But these
two sorts of knowledge of a thing can and must be separated analytically
in order to recognize and understand the differences in the problems pre-
sented by the different types of real proof. For the time being, therefore,
we shall ignore that a thing, offered and admitted so that a jury can observe
one or more of its sensible qualities, may be named by the offer or known
by the jury as a sensible object of a certain sort. In order to do this, wo
shall refer to the thing as "this" and disregard the kind of thing "this" may
be, apparently or actually. "This" will accordingly denote a particular thing.
There are various ways of classifying sensible qualities, but differences
among them are not significant for our analysis because our problem is
primarily to distinguish between sensible and non-sensible qualities and
77. See note 89, infra.
78. Or an event. See notes 18 and 64, supra.
[ VOL. 5
REAL PROOF
between sensible qualities and ambiguous characteristics. We shall be con-
tent, therefore, to present the classification which happens to be the ancient
and traditional analysis of the sensibles. There are two divisions.
(1) The sensibles are either proper or common, 79 according as they
can be sensed by one and only one or by two or more of the senses. Thus,
colors and odors and tones are proper sensibles because qualities of each
of these sorts can be sensed by one and by only one sense, by vision, olfaction
and audition, respectively. In contrast, size and shape and number and
motion are common sensibles because qualities of each of these sorts can be
sensed by two or more senses. Thus, shape can be sensed by sight and
touch. In the adjudicated cases We find both proper and common sensibles
named by the perceptual purposes for which things have been admitted. 'In
Sampson v. St. Louis & San Francisco R.R.,80 the jurors were permitted to
touch plaintiff's hand in order to feel it as cold; in McAndrews v. Leonard,81
to touch parts of plaintiff's skull in order to feel them as hard or soft; and in
Martin v. Shell Petroleum Corp.,82 to taste, the distillate of certain water in
order to sense it as salty. All of these qualities are proper sensibles; tempera-
ture, hardness and softness can be sensed only by the cutaneous, and flavor,
only by the gustatory sense. In Woodward & Lothrop v. Heed88 the jury was
permitted to inspect a fur coat in order to determine whether the fur was
"worn off or was matted down"; in Louisville & N. R.R. v. Jackson's Ad-n'r,8 4
to inspect a horseshoe to determine whether or not it was bent; and in Close
v. Sain,s5 to "view" the water below a dam, to determine whether or not and
in what direction it was flowing. "Being matted" and "being bent" are com-
mon sensibles, sorts of shapes which can'be sensed by sight or by touch. So is
motion a common sensible, a quality which can be sensed by sight, by touch
or by ear.
(2) The sensibles are either simple or complex. 6 A simple sensible
quality is one which can be sensed by one or more specific organs of sense; it
79. The distinction between proper and common sensibles is traditional throughout
the history of psychology, though made in different terms. See ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA.
bk. III, c. 1; ST. TnOMAS AQUINAS, SU.IMMA THEOLOGICA, First Part, Q. LXXVIII.
A 3, Reply; LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk, II, c. 8, Sec. 9.
Locke makes the distinction between proper and common sensibles in terms of the differ-
ence between secondary and primary qualities.
80. 156 Mo. App. 419, 138 S.W. 98 (1911).
81. 99 Vt. 512, 134 Atl. 710 (1926).
82. 133 Kan. 124, 299 Pac. 261 (1931).
83. 44 A.2d 369 (D.C. Mun. App. 1945). "Worn" names an ambiguous characteristic.
84. 250 Ky. 92, 61 S.W.2d 1104 (1933).
85. 27 Iowa 503 (1869).
86. This distinction between simple and complex sensibles is also traditional, though
made in different terms. See LOCKE, op. cit., supra note 79, bk. II, c. 12, Sec. 1, and
WUNDr, OUTLINES OF PSYCHOLOGY, pt. II, § 8 (3d rev. Eng. ed. 1907). For a general re-
view of the analysis of sensation which correlates psychology and physiology, see E. G.
BORING, THE PftYSICAL DI iqio-Nqs OF CONSCIOUSNESS (1933),
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may be a proper or a common sensible. A complex sensible quality is one
which, as far as we know, cannot be sensed by any specific sense organ.
The distinction between simple and complex sensibles is a more difficult
one than that between proper and common sensibles; it depends on the
precision of the physiological analysis of the sense organs and their specific
receptivities. This can be illustrated by the consideration of such qualities
as "wet" and "rough." The physiology of the cutaneous senses has dis-
covered only four specific receptivities in the cells of epithelial tissue, both
cutaneous and sub-cutaneous: (1) the sense of warmth; (2) the sense of
cold; (3) the sense of pressure; and (4) the sense of pain. There is
no sense organ which is receptive specifically of the qualities we call "wet"
and "rough"; yet there is no question that these are sensible qualities.
Physiological research shows that each of them is a combination of sensible
qualities of the cutaneous variety. Psychological analysis shows that this
combination is not a mere summation of simple sensibles but a pattern or
configuration of them; wetness and roughness are gestalts87 in the cutaneous
fields of sensibility.
88
As we shall see, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish complex qualities
which are totally sensible, that is, which are sensory gestalts, from ambiguous
characteristics, those complex qualities the complexity of which is constituted
by a combination of sensible and non-sensible qualities. For the present it
suffices to say that it is only wheri a thing is admitted so that a jury can
observe one of its wholly sensible qualities that real proof of the first type
occurs, and that it occurs whether the wholly sensible quality is proper or
common, simple or complex.
87. The concept of a gestalt or pattern of sensibles is an extremely important
correction of the error in psychological analysis, beginning with Locke's Essay and
running through modern psychology, which is the treatment of the complex sensible
as a mere summation of simples. For the general statement of this criticism see
W. KOHLER, GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY (1929), particularly c. 3. The correction of the
modern analysis of sensation made recently by gesialtthcorie is in conformity with the
ancient traditions of the analysis of sensation.
88. But these complex sensibles or sensory gestalts are frequently not in a single
sensory field. Thus, most of the qualities we commonly refer to as tastes are neither
simple taste qualities nor gustatory gestalts, if by the latter we mean combinations of
nothing but gustatory qualities. We speak of something as having a "gritty taste"; the
simple qualities that constitute this sensible pattern are both gustatory and tactual and,
perhaps, also kinaesthetic. This raises a problem with respect to the complex sensibles.
Are they to be classified according as their constituent elements are either in a single
sensory field or in more than one sensory field? "Roughness" might thus be classified
as one sort of complex sensible if it is a pattern of pressure sensations, whereas
"grittiness" would be of another sort. Further, are complex sensibles to be distinguished
as proper and common, and by the same criterion that simple sensibles are thus dis-
tinguished? The quality we call "wet" is a pattern in the cutaneous field and also a
pattern in the visual field; we can feel or see whether a thing is wet. And if we push
this analysis further, we may be forced to conclude that all of the common sensibles,
such as shape and motion, are also complex sensibles; thus the shape of a thing may
be either a tactual or a visual gestalt. But final answers to these questions are not,
as we shall see, prerequisite to the solution of the basic problem of admissibility when
a thing is offered so that a jury can observe one of its sensible qualities.
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§ 1. The Proposition of Real Evidence
What precisely is the nature of tle knowledge which a jury acquires
when it observes a sensible quality of a thing? Or, to put the same question
differently, what precisely is the nature of the propositions of real evidence
which are employed as probantia in the first type of real proof?
We can answer this question by supposing that this is exhibited to a
jury so that the jurors can observe it as having the color called "red," and by
considering how in an ordinary language, such as English, the jurors could
express correctly the knowledge which they obtained by looking at this for that
purpose.80 The color of a thing is one of its sensible qualities; it is a visible
quality and, hence, can be known directly. If the jurors were asked to express
their knowledge, they would probably say "This is red,"90 but if they did so,
they would not be expressing it correctly, 91 for their knowledge would be
perceptual knowledge and a sentence of that sort expresses inferential knowl-
edge. 92 The jurors could properly say only "We see this as red" or "This is
for ius red" or "This appears to its to be red." It would be indifferent which of
these sentences they used, for each would express their perceptual knowledge
of this; they would express the same proposition.93 Nevertheless, for the sake
of uniformity we shall always use a sentence of the form "This appears to
me to be red"' 4 to express perceptual knowledge of the quality of a thing.95
89. It will be remembered that a proposition is expressed by a declarative sen-
tence or by what amounts to the same thing, the answer to a theoretical question
expressed by Yes or No, and also that a proposition is not identical with the sentence
by which it is expressed. (See notes 6, 40, supra.) Cf. Hiller v. Johnson, 162 Wis.
19, 22-23, 154 N.W. 845, 846 (1915): "Plaintiff claimed an injury to his shoulder
joint, and he was permitted, over the objections of defendants, to raise his arm up and
down before the jury for the purpose of demonstrating to them that crepitation resulted
evidencing an injured or imperfect joint. While so doing the following occurred:
Plaintiff's counsel to a juror: 'Do you hear that?' Juror: 'There is a slight noise there.'
Plaintiff's counsel to another juror: 'Put your ear to his arm.' Juror: 'Yes.' Plaintiff's
counsel to the jury: 'Do you hear it?' Jury: 'Yes.'"
90. Real inferences are usually made habitually and, therefore, unconsciously. See
Hiller v. Johnson, supra, note 89.
91. Unless, of course, "for us, the jury" is understood by reason of the context in
which the sentence is uttered. For the sake of analytical clarity, we shall never use
the word "is" when we mean "is for the jury" or any other observer.
92. As we have said and as we shall subsequently show, a sentence of this sort
expresses the proximate probandum of a step of real proof.
93. In short, the words "is for us" are equivalent in meaning to the words "appears to
us" and both sets of words are equivalent in this context to the words "we see," although
these last have a reference usually restricted to visible appearances. Primarily, and in
the strictest sense, the direct knowledge of the jurors is knowledge about themselves,
their knowledge that they see this as red, It is only secondarily knowledge about this
which they see as red.
94. While "I see this as red" more precisely indicates the nature of the knowledge
which is being expressed, the advantage of this formulation is that the meaning of the
word "appears" is not restricted to any particular field of sensitivity.
95. As we have pointed out, such knowledge is possible only of sensible objects and
of sensible qualities. We shall later discuss singular propositions which are not -im-
mediate, which are expressed by sentences of the form "This is red" rather than of the
form "This appears to the jury as red." It is enough at the moment to say that while
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This formulation reveals that both that which is observed and the observer
are elements of perceptual knowledge and, hence, that the content of a
sentence of this form can be changed merely by changing the name of what
is said to be apparent and of him to whom it is said to be apparent. But in
trials by jury it is the jurors who are the observers of the evidence. Conse-
quently, we are justified in saying that in the first type of real proof prop-
ositions of real evidence are expressed by sentences of the form "This appears
to the jury to have a quality of a certain sort."
We can now understand the elements of such propositions. Sentences
boy which they are expressed contain two singular references, a reference to
the particular thing which is the exhibit and a reference to the particular
observers of the thing who are the jurors; but they also contain a universal
reference to a kind of sensible quality of which a particular instance is
apparent. That is to say that such propositions have singular terms as their
subjects and universal terms as their predicates ;,5a and this marks them as
singular propositions. 6 The universal term is a concept or idea, an abstraction
such propositions always formulate indirect rather than direct knowledge, it may be
either indirect knowledge of that which can be known directly or indirect knowledge
of that which cannot be known directly but only indirectly.
95a. A term is the logical representation of an idea or concept, as a proposition is
the logical representation of a judgment. The distinction between singular and uni-
versal terms is based upon the distinction between singular and non-singular entities,
between particular things and their particular attributes and kinds of things and kinds
of attributes. A particular is an individual considered as an instance of a kind or as a
member of a class, that is, as one of an indefinite number of individuals which have
an attribute in common; an attribute is that which two or more individuals can possess
and with respect to which they can be said to be of the same kind or class. A singular
term is thus a particular, and, as we have said, is symbolized by a proper name or
definite descriptive phrase. (See note 42, supra.) A universal term, on the other hand,
is a kind or class or an attribute which determines a kind or class; it represents an idea
or concept, that is, what we understand of any thing when we understand it. An idea
is universal in the sense that it is abstracted from individuality. The idea signified
by the word "man" does not bring before us any man in particular; it leaves out of ac-
count all of the individual conditions which distinguish one man from another; and,
hence, while remaining the same the idea can be applied to the most dissimilar men.
As we have said, a universal term is signified by a common name or an indefinite
descriptive phrase. (See note 42, supra.) The distinction between subject and predicate
is based upon the distinction between that which can be classified or characterized and
that which is a classification or characterization. A subject is that which can be classified
or characterized. It follows that a singular term can be only a subject, and that a
universal term and only a universal term can be a predicate. But since one class may
include or exclude another class, totally or partially, a universal term can also be a
subject. See note 25, supra.
96. All immediate singular propositions are of the form "This-is characterized as-
appearing to be such and such." A strict subject-predicate analysis would require us
to distinguish at least two propositions which are expressed conjunctively by such
sentences as "I see this as red" and "This appears to me to be red": (1) A proposition
in which the subject is the observer and the predicate a kind of observation, thus "I-
am characterized as-seeing something as red"; and (2) a proposition in which the
subject is the thing observed and the predicate is a kind of sensible quality, thus "This--
is characterized as-appearing to someone to be red." (See note 93, supra.) It should be
noted that the conjunction of these propositions is expressed by each of the sentences
stated above; it is for that reason that they are equivalent as sentences. For simplicity
in subsequent discussion, and because it is sufficiently precise for our analytical purposes,
we shall not hereafter distinguish the propositions which are expressed conjunctively by
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from the data of sense. 97 A jury not only sees this particular instance of the
color red, it not only has that sensation, but it also understands the particular
visible quality as an instance of redness. This throws additional light upon the
nature of perceptual knowledge. As we have just suggested, a sensible
quality of a thing can be perceived only by those who not only can sense it
but who also understand it. That is to say that perceptual knowledge has both
a sensational and an intellectual component 9s and that a person wholly lacking
in ideas can no more acquire perceptual knowledge than a person. wholly
lacking in sensitivity. It is to say also that persons who understand a specific
thing or a specific quality of a thing differently will perceive it differently.
In the supposititious case that we have been discussing this was exhibited to
a jury so that the jurors could observe a particular instance of a visible
quality of this, the color called "red." We think that it will be agreed that this
quality will be apparent to different observers in the same way only if they
understand it in the same way, and that if they understand it in the same
,way they will observe it in the same way, whatever it is called.99 What a
specific sensible quality is called is therefore important only because the
perceptual purpose for which a thing is offered must be generally and uni-
formly intelligible to the tribunal, to both judge and jury; and this will be the
case only if the quality is named not only by a common name but also by
one which is unambiguous in the sense that it is commonly used by men of
ordinary linguistic habits with a uniformity sufficient for all the practical
purposes of unambiguous communication. And it will not be such a name
unless it has substantially the same connotation for such men.100
such sentences. We shall treat them as expressing a single proposition- of the form
"This-is characterized as-appearing to the jury to be red." Nor shall we distinguish
between a proposition of that form and the sentence by which it is signified.
97. See note 95a, supra. The abstraction must, of course, be prior in time to the
knowledge of which it is an element; in other words, we must understand redness before
we can make the judgment that this appears to us as red. We are not saying that we
must understand red before we can see red; rather the reverse is true, that is, we must
see red before we can understand what redness is. But "seeing red" is not knowledge; it is
merely the having of a sensation, and we can sense qualities before we can actually
understand them as qualities of a specific kind. In short, the word "red" names a
particular sensation and a kind of quality, and-the proposition "This appears to me as
red" is sensitive knowledge in which there are both sensational and intellectual components.
See ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, pt. I, Q. LXXXIV, A. 6, 7, 8 and-
Q. LXXXV, A. 1, 2.
98. If the knowledge were purely intellectual, it would be a general proposition and
would contain no references to particular things or qualities as these are known by
sense, but only to kinds of things or qualities, thus "To be red is to be visible."
99. It is the same apparent color whether it is called "red" or "rot" or "rouge"; it
would be the same apparent color even to an English-speaking person who, through
ignorance of the vocabulary or mischeviously, called it "blue."
100. In other words, the name of the quality in question must have substantially
the same meaning for ordinary men; and it will, only if it evokes the same concept in
the minds of all of them. The name of a quality, or of anything else, is unambiguous and
commonly intelligible to two men when its significance for both of them is substantially
the same conception of that which is named. We shall, therefore, use the phrase "common
concept" to refer to that which must be present in the minds of two or more men if they
are to use a word unambiguously and with common understanding of its meaning. As
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An immediate singular proposition is thus seen to be direct knowledge of
particular things and of their qualities, immediate knowledge that a thing
appears to be of a certain sort or to possess a quality of a certain sort. But
how can such a proposition be asserted?
If it is said that a thing appeared to someone to have a certain quality,
the assertoric value1 ' of the proposition so expressed depends upon who is
asserting it. Thus, if we, the authors, say, "This page appears to you, the
reader, to be white," we are not reporting an observation of ours. We cannot
observe the event of a thing's appearing to you to have a certain quality.
10 2
We can observe this page as white; we can know that both you and we are
men of ordinary linguistic habits, normal sensitivity and common understand-
ing; and we can therefore infer that if you look at this page under the same
conditions that we did, you too will see it as white. Whether we say that
this now appears or that this will appear to you to be white, the knowledge
which we are expressing is indirect or inferential. In the same way, a judge's
knowledge that a thing will appear to a jury to possess a certain quality is a
matter of inference, but a juror's knowledge that the thing does appear to
him to possess that quality is a matter of observation. In trials by jury, it is
the jurors and not the judge who answer material issues. It is they who
must acquire the knowledge needed to answer them by the exercise of their
sensitive and rational powers. It is they who are to be instructed by the
we shall see, whether or not the offer of a thing names a quality of which the jurors can
reasonably be expected to have a common concept, can become an important consideration
in determining the admissibility of the thing; this is, of course, a question of fact to
be decided by the judge. We have chosen "red" in the supposititious case which we have
been discussing because it so obviously involves a common concept. We shall return
to this problem later in Part liA, in which we will discuss the epistemic condition
of admissibility
101. All propositions are actually either true or false. A proposition is true if what
it states to be the case is the case; it is false if what it states to be the case is not the
case. Thus, the actual truth or falsity of a proposition can be determined only by reference
to what is actually the case. The assertoric value of a proposition is the value which we
assign to it in the light of our knowledge. But our knowledge is always expressed in
propositions; consequently, we cannot make a direct comparison of what is the case in
some respect and our knowledge of what is the case in that respect. The assertion of
a proposition is a psychological act; it is an act of judgment constituting knowledge. We
may be either certain or dubious in our judgment, according as our knowledge is adequate
or inadequate. Thus, depending upon the state of our knowledge we can assert a proposi-
tion as certainly true or false or as probably true or false. Just as the assertion of
a proposition as true or false is a judgment of certainty, so the assertion of a proposition
as probable is a judgment of doubt; the extent of the doubt is indicated by the degree
of probability which the proposition is asserted as possessing. In short, probability
is the opposite not of truth or falsity but of certainty; and, just as propositions have
only two actual values, truth and falsity, so they have only two assertoric values, cer-
tainty and probability. And while the actual value of a proposition is determined only
by reference to what is actually the case, its assertoric value is determined by reference
to the state of our knowledge about what is actually the case. See notes 23, 43, supra;
TIF, 1249, 1254.
102. As Vaughan, C.J., said in Bushell's Case, Vaugh. 135, 148, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006,
1013 (C.P. 1670), "A man cannot see by anothers eye, nor hear by anothers ear, no more




evidence and proofs. It is they, therefore, who acquire and possess the
knowledge formulated by evidential propositions. But to possess the knowl-
edge is to assert the propositions. Accordingly, it is jurors and not judges
who assert propositions of real evidence, propositions of the form, "This
appears to the jury to be such and such"; and it is for that reason that such
propositions can be asserted as true. 0 3 Not only are they knowledge pos-
sessed by the jurors but they are the kind of knowledge which cannot be
probable. To put the matter differently, that a proposition of real evidence
cannot be probable follows from its being an immediate proposition.10 4  An
immediate proposition is indemonstrable, and since the probability of a
proposition is always relative to the probabilities of other propositions which
are probative of it, an immediate proposition cannot be probable; a proposi-
tion which cannot be proved by other propositions cannot be probable. 10
The proposition "This appears to the jury to be red," asserted by the jurors,
is for them indemonstrable and, hence, not probable. This can be simply
understood as follows: You, the reader, know directly that you do or do not
see this page as white; no propositions can possibly be adduced to prove to
you either that you do or do not.106
103. See note 101, supra.. We know, of course that this is not a description of the
behavior of juries. We know that only rarely does a jury consciously assert a propo-
sition of real evidence as true and then infer its proximate probandum. CSee note 90,
supra.) But that does not affect the validity of our analysis because, even though no jury
ever asserted a proposition of real evidence, a jury's perceptual knowledge of an exhibit
is necessarily such a proposition, and to possess the knowledge is to assert the proposi-
tion.
104. See note 101, supra.
105. This does not mean that propositions which can be proved by other propositions
can never be asserted as true. If their premises can be asserted as true, they can be
asserted as true, but if one of their premises can be asserted only as probable they can
be asserted only as probable. See note 101, supra.
106. In short, your knowledge is adequate and, hence, you can be certain in your
judgment. But it should be noticed that in the statement attributed to you, you do not
say that this is red, but rather that it appears to you as red, that you see it as red.
The singular proposition "This appears to me to be red" is the kind of knowledge that
has been traditionally called a sensitive intuition; it is immediate in the same sense that
axioms, which are intellectual intuitions, are immediate and indemonstrable general
propositions. For this analysis of immediate propositions as sensitive and intellectual
intuitions, see ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS, bk. VI, cc. 6, 11; and POSTERIOR
ANALYTICS, bk. II, c. 19; LocxE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING, bk. IV,
cc. 2, 11; and WILLTAIL JAMES, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY, c. 28 (1890). For the
analysis of sensitive judgments, see also Kant's distinction between judgments of perdep-
tion and judgments of experience in his PROLEGOMENA To ANY FUTURE METAPHYSICS,
pt. II, §§ 18, 19 and 20. Cf. CHIEF BARON GILBERT, EVIDENCE 2, 3 (1795 ed.) : "All
certainty is a clear and distinct perception: and all clear and distinct perceptions depend
upon a man's own proper senses: Thus, this in the first place is certain, and that which
we cannot doubt of it if we would, that one perception or idea is not another; . . . and
when perceptions are thus distinguished upon the first view, it is called self evidence, or
intuitive knowledge .... Now most of the business of civil life subsists on actions of men
that are transient things, and therefore often times are not capable of strict demonstration;
which, as I said, is founded on the view of our senses: and therefore the rights of men
must be determined by probability. Now, as all demonstration is founded on the view of
a man's own proper senses by a gradation of clear and distinct perceptions, so all
probability is founded upon views "partially, or in some degree," obscure and indistinct,
or upon report from the sight of others."
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It may nevertheless be objected that although immediate singular proposi-
tions cannot be asserted as probable, they can be asserted either as true or
as false, and hence that their assertion as true may be incorrect. There are
only two ways in which the statement "I see this as red" can be false.
(1, The speaker may be lying, that is, he may be telling you that he sees
as red what he knows he sees as orange. But he cannot be mistaken as
to what he knows himself as seeing; if he did not know the truth privately
he could not lie socially. One cannot lie to oneself about one's own sensitive
intuitions.1°7 We need not take account of this possible aberration. For
although jurors can lie socially by giving answers to material issues which
involve a denial of their perceptual knowledge of evidence, the analytical
point which we have made is nevertheless valid. Consequently, our analysis
of the problems of real proof can ignore the possibility of such prevarication
by a jury. (2) The other way in which the statement can be thought of
as false is not genuinely a case of falsity, but rather a case of ambiguous
communication. Thus, if you misuse the common name "red" to name what
you see as blue, you are not lying if you say that you see it as red. It is
true that you do see it as "red" in your peculiar use of that word, although
anyone else will be misled if he understands that you see it as "red" in the
comtmon use of that word. But since, as we will see, a thing should not be
exhibited to jurors so that they can observe one of its qualities unless the
quality is named by an unambiguous name,108 this possible aberration can
also be disregarded. Even if a judge committed an error in this respect the
proposition of real evidence would not become probable.
We can conclude, therefore, that propositions of real evidence of the
form "This appears to the jury to have a quality of a certain sort" have the
status in a trial of propositions which can be and are asserted as true.
§ 2. The Evidential Hypothesis
A jury can never decide a material issue by asserting a proposition of
real evidence. 0 9 This is to say (1) that a proposition of real evidence is
never a material proposition and (2) that at least one step of proof must
follow upon its assertion, a step of proof in which it is employed as a probans.
That the first of these two statements is true follows from the nature of
materiality. It can never be legally significant, although it may be logically
107. Hence, when a person says to you that he sees this as red, you can assert as
probable the proposition 'He sees this as red' on the basis of his assertion as true of
'I see this as red'; but only as probable because you can never know that it is true that
he is not lying. Your knowledge in that respect is necessarily inadequate.
108. For the sense in which the word unambiguous is here used, see pp. 371-76, 373
n.100, supra.
109. See p. 358, supra.
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significant, that during the trial of a material issue a jury perceives something
in a certain way, that a thing appears to the jury to have a quality of a
certain sort, although it may be legally significant that it las a qualtiy of
that sort. It is for that reason that material propositions are always demon-
strable, and never immediate, singular propositions. The truth of the second
of these statements is involved in the truth of the first, and is understood
as soon as the nature of an evidential proposition is understood. In a single
litigious controversy a singular proposition can have a dual status: It can
be both a material proposition and an evidential proposition, that is, a proposi-
tion which can be employed in the proof of some other material proposition.
If a proposition is an evidential proposition it must be used probatively,
whether or not it is also a material proposition. But since a proposition of
real evidence is never a material proposition, its status can only be that of
an evidential proposition, which is to say that it is admitted because and so
that it can be used in proving a material proposition. It is for that reason
that, as we have said, whenever a thing is admitted as evidence not only is
a proposition of real evidence admitted but at least one step of proof occurs
in which this proposition is employed probatively. This step will almost
always °10 be a step of real proof, which is characteristically different from a
step of testimonial or of circumstantial proof, and it requires further analysis.
For the sake of simplicity, let us assume a case in which the proximate
probandum of a step of real proof of the first type is also an 'ultimate pro-
bandum, a material proposition which has been denied. The proximate
probandum of a proposition of the form "This appears to the jury to have
such and such a quality" is always a proposition of the form "This has such
and such a quality"; in the case we have been supposing it is "This is red."
But "This is red" cannot be inferred from "This appears to the jury to be
red" except in the context of an evidential hypothesis, a general proposition
with which the proposition of real evidence must be conjoined"' as a
premise. 1 2 The indispensable general proposition can be expressed in various
ways: "Appearing to a jury to be red implies being red" or "To appear to a
jury to be red is to be red" or "If a thing appears to a jury to be red, it is
red." This example indicates that the general propositions which can be
employed as evidential hypotheses in real proof of the first type are of the
form "If a thing appears to a jury to have a sensible quality of a certain
110. We do not say "always" because, as we have seen, a proposition of real evidence
is capable of being employed as a probans in a step of circumstantial proof.
111. "Conjunction" is the relation of any two propositions by "and"; just as "is"
symbolizes the relation of predication (see note 95, supra), so "and" symbolizes the re-
lation of conjunction. But "and" does not here have an additive connotation; it means
neither alone but both together. It is thus seen to be a material and not a formal
relation between propositions.
112. For a fuller understanding of the formal conditions of the validity of a step of
real proof, see TIP, 1271 et seq.
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sort, it has a quality of that sort." A proposition of that form, conjoined
with a proposition of the form "This appears to the jury to have a sensible
quality of a certain sort," yields a proposition of the form "This has a
sensible quality of that sort." But although a step of proof is not valid
unless its premises formally yield its conclusion, the satisfaction of the logical
conditions of formally valid inference does not by itself accomplish a step
of proof. An inference is not actually accomplished until premises are
asserted as the basis for the assertion of a conclusion.'"
We have seen that an admitted proposition of real evidence, one of the
premises of a step of real proof, can be and is asserted as true because it
is a jury's perceptual knowledge. But what is the basis for the assertion of
the other premise, the evidential hypothesis, and how can it be asserted?
In order to answer these questions we must state more explicitly the form
of the general propositions which can be employed as evidential hypotheses
in this type of real proof; and this requires us to interpret the proximate
probandum of such a real inference.
What does it mean to say that this has a quality of a certain sort?
What, for example, does it mean to say that this is red? If redness is a
kind of sensible quality, then to be red is to be capable of being sensed as
red by some sensitive animal. Redness is thus the potentiality of a quality
to be sensed as red; this potentiality is actualized when the quality appears
to someone to be red. To say that this appears to a jury to be red is to say
that the jury actually perceives this as red, that this has for the jury that
sensible quality. We shall use the words "apparent" and "non-apparent"
to qualify the phrase "sensible quality," according as we wish to indicate
that such a quality has or has not actually been perceived by someone.
11 4
We can summarize what we have just said in this way: The non-apparent
being, the being in itself, of a sensible quality, is its potentiality of appearing
to be; its apparent being, its being for sensitive animals, is the actuality of
its appearing to them to be.
But what we have said indicates that "This is red" means more than
that this has the potentiality of being perceived as red; it indicates that its
meaning must include a reference to the kind of animal which, by perceiving
this, has actualized the potentiality. If this appears to some human being
to be red, it has the potentiality of so appearing to other human beings. But
113. See p. 355, supra, and TIP, 1272-73.
114. Only sensible qualities can be either apparent or non-apparent. If a thing has
qualities which are not sensible, they do not have the potentiality of being sensed and,
hence, can never be apparent. Thus, the physical property of a thing which is called
density is not a sensible quality of it and hence can never be apparent; but sensible
qualities may either be apparent or non-apparent. Thus, the color of a thing in a dark
room is a non-apparent sensible quality of it under that condition.
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men differ, absolutely or in degree, with respect to their linguistic habits,
their sensitive powers, the range of their understanding, and the conditions
under which they make observations of various sorts; and consideration of
these differences suggests further qualifications of the inference. Men differ,
for example, with respect to the sensitive power called "vision." If this
appears to be red to normal eyes, the inference that this is red means that
this has the potentiality of appearing to be red to normal eyes; but if this
appears to be grey to color-blind eyes, it cannot be inferred that this is grey
in the sense that it has the potentiality of appearing to be grey to normal
eyes. Moreover, just as the normality of the sensitive powers is involved
in the inference and restricts the meaning of its conclusion, so the character
of the conditions of observation affects the inference and the meaning of its
conclusion. If under certain conditions of illumination this appears to us
to be red, the conclusion that this is red must be interpreted to mean that
under similar conditions of illumination it has the potentiality of so appearing
to similarly constituted individuals. In brief, the proximate probandum of
a real inference of the first type cannot be interpreted except in terms of
the conditions of observation and the character of the observers. "This is
red" always means that this has the potentiality of appearing to be red to
someone under some conditions, but to whom and under what conditions?
We can answer these questions only if we know the character of. the person
who perceived this as red and the conditions under which he did so.
A thing is offered during the trial of a material issue so that the jurors
can observe a sensible quality of the thing; it is they by whom the quality's
potentiality of appearing to be a quality of a certain sort is to be actualized.
But jurors are or, in any case, are presumed to be men of ordinary linguistic
habits, n 5 normal sensitive powers" 6 and common experience ;117 and, as we
115. Buscii, LAW A-D TACTICS IX JURY TRIALS § 58 (1949): "Speaking generally,
[the qualifications which jurors are required to possess] relate to age, ...ability to
read, write, speak or understand the English language, mental capacity, possession of
one's 'natural faculties' (or 'health' or 'having no bodily infirmity'). . . ." As to the
ability to communicate and to receive communications in English, see, for example,
State v. Pratt, 114 Kan. 660, 220 Pac. 505 (1923) ; Sullenger v. State, 79 Tex. Cr. 98,
182 S.W. 140 (1910). See also BuscH, op cit. supra § 96.
116. BUSCH, op. cit. supra note 115, § 97: "Impairment of the faculties of sight and
hearing to such a degree as to seriously interfere with a person's seeing and hearing
the participants in a trial .. . are grounds for a challenge for cause." As to the
sense of sight, see Rhodes v. State, 128 Ind. 189, 27 N.E. 866 (1891) ; State v. Norman,
135 Iowa 483, 113 N.W. 340 (1907) ; Guthrie v. State, 87 Okla. Cr. 112, 127, 194 P.2d
895 (1948). As to the sense of hearing, see Higgins v. Commonwealth, 287 Ky. 767,
155 S.W.2d 209 (1941) ; State v. Reed, 206 La. 143, 19 So.2d 28 (1944) ; Lindsey v.
State, 189 Tenn. 355, 225 SAV.2d. 533, 15 A.L.R.2d 527 (1949); Black V. Continental
Casualty Co., 9 S.W.2d 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1928) ; Er parte Lovelady, 15Z Tex. Cr.
93, 207 S.W.2d 396 (1948).
In Rhodes v. State, supra, the court said: "One of the jurors made affidavit
that his eyesight was so defective that he was unable 'to distinguish one from another
of the faces of the witnesses; that he did not see the face of the defendant; and that
he did not see the expressions of the witnesses testifying, nor observe their deportment
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shall see, a thing is inadmissible unless it is offered for a perceptual purpose
which can be accomplished by such persons under the observational condi-
tions which a trial can provide. If a thing is offered so that jurors can
observe one of its qualities, it is inadmissible unless the quality named by
the offer is not only a sensible quality but a kind of sensible quality which
can be apparent to men like jurors, that is, men of ordinary linguistic habits,
normal sensitive powers and common understanding, and unless it can be
exhibited to them under appropriate conditions of observation.IIs It follows
that the meaning which must be assigned to "This is red," as the proximate
probandum of a step of real proof, is that under appropriate conditions of
observation this has the potentiality of appearing to men of ordinary linguistic
habits, normal sensitive powers and common understanding to be red. It
follows also that, stated fully, the form of the general propositions which
can serve as evidential hypotheses in the first type of real proof is "If under
appropriate conditions of observation a thing appears to men of ordinary
linguistic habits, normal sensitive powers and common understanding to
possess a sensible quality of a certain sort,"9 it has a quality of that sort"
or demeanor.' We think that the juror was not competent to sit, even in cases where
the testimony consists entirely of the statements of the witnesses. Again and again have
verdicts been allowed to stand because of the effect declared to be exerted by the demeanor
and deportment of witnessses; and, surely, no one who can not see the expression of
faces, nor observe deportment and demeanor, can justly weigh testimony. But in this
instance various articles were placed before the jury, and used as illustrative of the
testimony, none of which were seen by the juror. Clearly, his unfortunate infirmity
incapacitated him from properly observing the evidence." 128 Ind. at 196-97, 27 N.E. at
868.
Cf. Blume, Jury Selection Analyzed, 42 MIcH. L. REv. 831 (1944) : "In order
to render efficient jury service, a juror should be able to see clearly, hear clearly, and
speak with sufficient clarity to make himself understood. He should . ..be free from
every bodily condition likely to impair the quality of his thinking. Beyond these ,,imple
requirements physical qualifications need not go." This overlooks that jurors often
have to observe evidence not only by seeing and hearing it, but also by smelling, tasting
or touching it. See, for example, Enyart v. People, 70 Colo. 362, 201 Pac. 564 (1921) ;
Martin v. Shell Petroleum Corp., 133 Kan. 124, 299 Pac. 261 (1931); Sampson v. St.
Louis & San Francisco Ry., 156 Mo. App. 419, 138 S.W. 98 (1911); McAndrews v.
Leonard, 99 Vt. 512, 134 Atl. 710 (1926). Cf. Gex, Rcal Evidencc in Missisippi, 17 Miss.
L. J. 180 (1945) : "The presentation of [real evidence] is a mode of enabling the court
to reach a conclusion through the sense of actual sight, hearing, or taste. Some argu-
ment has been raised as to whether the senses of smell and feel may properly be used in
the process of determining what is real evidence, and this question has never been
definitely settled.'
117. In Mathews v. Caldwell, 5 Ga. App. 336, 339, 63 S.E. 250, 252 (1908), the
court said: "Jurors are chosen, not only for uprightness, but also for intelligence. They
are supposed to bring into the box, as a part of that intelligence, experience and a
knowledge of the common things of life. They are supposed to know what a pistol is
and what it is designed for. Presumably they are qualified to look at this mechanical
contrivance and to say whether it is a firearm or not." See also Buscn op. cit. supra, note
115, §§ 58, 96; Ex parte Lovelady, supra note 116.
118. The conditions of admissibility of things offered as evidence, and especially the
epistemic condition, are nowhere explicitly formulated as we formulate them, but that
they are the conditions of admissibility is apparent from the rulings of the courts upon
questions of admissibility. These we will discuss in Part III.
119. If the judge has ruled correctly upon the question of admissibility, the quality
will be of a sort which such men can sense and which they understand.
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(in the sense that under similar conditions of observation it has the poten-
tiality of so appearing to similar men).
A general proposition can be asserted and employed as an evidential
hypothesis during the trial of a material issue, either as the result of its being
proved or as the result of its being judicially noticed; whether as the result
of the one or the other will usually depend upon whether it is special or
common knowledge.120 It is, we think, obvious fhat propositions of the
form which we have just stated are common knowledge; consequently, they
are always judicially noticed. But they are uncertain rather than certain
knowledge. Our incertitude arises from the inclusion in them of the words
"appropriate," "ordinary," "normal," "common," and "similar." Such words
signify either a mean in a graded distribution of degrees (that is, more or
less appropriate, more or less ordinary, and so on) or an ideal that can only
be approximated. As used in the evidential hypotheses of real proof, they
signify the former, averages representing groups of similar conditions and of
similarly constituted men.' 2 ' If they were not imprecise in this way, then
these general propositions could be asserted as true. For, in that event, the
subsequent clause--"it has that quality"-of such propositions would have to
be interpreted to mean "it has the potentiality of so appearing to identical
men under identical conditions." So interpreted, such propositions would
be true self-evidently; in the best sense of the word they would be tauto-.
logical. But they cannot be so interpreted. It is common knowledge that
no two men are precisely alike in sensitivity and understanding and that no
two observations can be made under precisely the same conditions. At the
most, observers and conditions of observation can be more or less alike; and
120. If the knowledge formulated by a general proposition is special knowledge, it
will be possessed only by men of special experience, that is, by specialists or experts.
[Cf. Mathews v. Caldwell, 5 Ga. App. 336, 339. 63 S.E. 250, 252 (1908): "Expert and
opinion evidence is useful only where the juror's range of personal intelligence, so far as
some particular branch of knowledge is concerned, fails to reach. . . ."] The chief
function of the expert witness is to impart to juries, composed of men of common experi-
ence, the generalized, specialized experience, formulated by general propositions, which
they need in order to be able to make circumstantial inferences. Frequently, if not
usually, the expert will himself make the inference and his testimony will take
the form of the singular proposition which is the conclusion of the inference, rather
than of the general proposition which is the special knowledge which he used as one of
his premises. But even in such a case he is reporting that knowledge to the jury im-
plicitly. In many, if not in most, such cases the juries could .themselves perform the
inferences if they were provided with the necessary evidential hypotheses. Indeed, it is
only when casuistry, which is the art of applying generalities to concrete cases, is
needed in order to make the inferences, that the expert must make them for, the jury:
in such cases he must function as casuist as well as specialist. In those jurisdictions
which recognize the exception to the hearsay rule which Wigmore calls the exception
for learned treatises (see 6 WmmRE §§ 1691-1700), a general proposition which is
special knowledge can be asserted as the result of a step of hearsay testimontial proof,
but it is obviously a step of expert testimonial proof nevertheless. Moreover, to some
extent judges judicially notice general propositions which are special knowledge. These
qualifications of the statement in the text will be elaborated in subsequent articles on
judicial notice and testimonial proof.
121. See the cases cited in notes 115-17, supra.
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therefore we cannot avoid the imprecision involved in the application of the
concepts of appropriateness, ordinariness, normality, commonness and simi-
larity to particular conditions and to particular men.
The fact is that the evidential hypotheses of real proof are empirical
generalizations and as such can never be asserted as more than probable, no
matter how high the degree of probability. 2 2 We know as the result of
common experience that we are sometimes deceived by the appearances of
things; that they are not always as they appear to us to be; that they appear
to us differently at different times and in different circumstances; and that
they appear differently to different men even in the same circumstances.
It is this knowldge which informs us that it is only probable that this is red
if under suitable conditions it appears to men of normal sensory capacity
and common understanding to be red. But although it can be asserted only
as probable, it can be asserted as highly probable 3 that if under appropriate
conditions of observation a thing appears to men of ordinary linguistic habits,
normal sensitive powers and common understanding to have a quality of a
certain sort, it has a quality of that sort in the sense that it has the, poten-
tiality 'o so appearing to similar men under similar conditions. The high
probability of propositions of that form is due, in the first place, to the
linguistic, sensory and intellectual capacities that jurors are required or pre-
122. In one sense, all generalizations from experience can be called "empirical"; but
in the theory of induction, which is the process of generalizing from particular experi-
ences, we customarily distinguish between those products of induction that can be
asserted as true and those that can be asserted only as probable. (See note 101, supra.)
The latter are usually called "empirical generalizations"; the former are usually called
axioms or self-evident truths. Axioms or self-evident truths, as the names indicate, are
immediate propositions that need no proof; indeed, they cannot be proved. For example,
that a physical whole is greater than any of its physical parts, is an axiom or self-
evident truth; it cannot be proved. Empirical or probable generalizations, on the other
hand, are said to be capable of and to need inductive proof because, without it, their
probability cannot be ascertained. Yet, although a probable proposition, unlike an
axiom, can be proved, it is not the case that all the highly probable empirical generaliza-
tions on which men rely, are established by a process of inductive proof, or have their
probability determined in the light of the evidence that would have to be marshalled in
order to make such a proof. Many are assumed to be highly probable; they are as-
serted by assumption rather than by proof; their high probability is assumed rather than
calculated in the light of particular instances. Their assumption is not incompatible with
their being inductively proved; nor does it mean the total absence of relevant knowledge
of particulars, but only that this relevant knowledge is not organized into a set of
probative propositions and used in a formally valid process of proof. Nevertheless, it is
possible to state the conditions under which men of sound judgment can and do assuine
empirical generalizations to be highly probable. Aristotle formulated those conditions
in a manner that is strikingly pertinent to the circumstances of judicial notice and of
expert testimonial proof. A general proposition can be assumed as highly probable, he
tells us, "if it is probable to all, or to most men, or to the wise, either to all or to
most or to the most expert, provided it is not contrary to common opinion; for anyone
would admit what is held by the wise, so long as it is not contrary to the opinions of most
men" (Topics, bk. I, c. 10, 104a 8-12).
123. We cannot here explain the degrees of probability, beyond saying that a
proposition is highly probable if it is more probable than its contradictory, and very




sumed to possess and to the manner in which juries are formed. 12 4 It is due,
in the second place, to the epistemic condition of the admissibility of a thing,
the condition that the jurors be capable of accomplishing the perceptual
purpose for which the thing is offered. The factors which the judge must
consider in determining the question of admissibility,-whether the quality
named by the offer is one which men of ordinary linguistic habits, normal
sensitive powers and common experience can sense and understand, and
whether the thing can be exhibited to the jurors under appropriate condi-
tions of observation,-are the very factors -which make such propositions
highly probable.
§ 3. The Proximate Probandum
We have seen that the conclusion of a step of real proof of the first type
is a singular proposition of the form "This has a quality of a certain sort,"
by which is meant that this has the potentiality of appearing under appropriate
conditions of observation to men of ordinary linguistic habits, normal sensitive
powers and common understanding to have a quality of that sort. We have
also seen that before it is proved it is a demonstrable proposition, and that
after it is proved it is an inferred or derived proposition which, if material
to the controversy, is an ultimate probandum, and if not, an intermediate
probandum and probans. Finally, we have seen that if it is a compound
proposition it can be used as an evidential proposition in either a step of
testimonial proof or in a step of circumstantial proof, but that if it is a simple
proposition it can be used as an evidential proposition only in a step of
circumstantial proof. It remains only to ask what its assertoric value is.
Although one of its probantia, the proposition of real evidence, can be
asserted as true, the probandum itself can be asserted only as probable
because the other of its probantia, the evidential hypothesis, can be asserted
only as probable. But it can always be asserted as highly probable. The
probability of the probandum of a step of proof of any sort, real, testimonial
or circumstantial, is determined in part by its own prior or antecedent proba-
bility, and in part by the probability of the conjunction of propositions that
are its probantia. 125 When we discuss the probative force of real proof, 126 we
124. Here we have especially in mind the qualifications which jurors are required
to possess, the voir dire examination of members of the panel, and challenges for cause.
125. The assertoric value of a conjunction of propositions is the product of the
assertoric values of the propositions comprising the conjunction. (1) If the conjunction
contains only two propositions and if each of them can be asserted as true and if we let
the number 1 represent the assertoric value of truth, then the conjunction will have the
assertoric value of 1, signifying certitude. (See note 101, supra.) (2), If, however, one
of propositions which are the proximate prabantia of the probandum of a step of real proof
the proposition "This appears to the jury to be red" the probantia of the proposition
"This is red" include the following evidential propositions: (1) "The conditions under
bility, then the conjunction can be asserted only as probable but the degree of its
probability will be the same as that of its probable component. (3) But if both propo-
1952]
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shall explain how the probability of the conclusion of a real inference is
calculated. ' \Ve shall then see that whatever its antecedent probability, the
probandum of a step of real proof of the first type can be asserted as highly
probable because the conjunction of probantia by which it is proved consists
of an evidential proposition which can be asserted as true and of an evidential
hypothesis which can be asserted as highly probable.
27
There are, however, additional factors which influence its probability,
the number of the jurors and the independence of their observations. Assum-
ing a jury of twelve, what is meant when it is said that this appeared to' the
jury to be red, is that it so appeared to each of the twelve jurors. If one
person sees this as red, it is probable that it is red, that is, that it has the
potentiality of appearing to other persons to be red. This probability is
increased if two persons independently see this as red, because each provides
a test of the appropriateness of the conditions under which the other observed
this, of the normality of his visiol, and of the extent of his understanding.
And if twelve persons independently see this as red, it becomes much more
probable that they are a fair sampling of the adult population with respect
to visual power and understanding, and hence much more probable that
under similar conditions similar members of the population will see this as
red or, in other words, that this is red.
128
sitions can be asserted only as probable, not only can the conjunction be asserted only
as probable, but the degree of its probability will necessarily be less than that of either
of its components, since the product of two fractional values is always less than that of
either of its factors.
126. As we shall, in Part IV.
127. It is arguable that in addition to the proposition of real evidence the conjunction
of proposition which are the proximate probantia of the probandum of a step of real proof
of the first type includes other evidential propositions. For example, if a thing is exhibited
to a jury so that they can and they do observe it as red, it is arguable that in addition to
the proposition "This appears to the jury to be red" the probantia of the proposition
"This is red" include the following evidential propositions: (1) "The conditions under
which the jury observed this were appropriate to the observation of the color of this",
(2) "The linguistic habits of the jurors are ordinary"; (3) "The vision of the jurors is
normal"; and (4) "The jurors possess common understanding." But we do not think
so. These are demonstrable singular propositions which, if proved, could be asserted
only as probable to some degree, but during the course of the trial of a material issue they
need not be proved and may not be disproved. For the purposes of the trial the ap-
propriateness of the conditions of observation is conclusively established by the judge's
ruling upon the question of admissibility, and the empanelling of the jury forecloses
all questions regarding the qualifications of the jurors. Whether the conditions of obser-
vation were appropriate and whether any of the jurors was disqualified are questions
which may be raised only upon a motion for a new trial or upon an appeal. See, for
example. Nuchols v. Commonwealth, 312 Ky. 171. 226 S.W.2d 796, 13 A.L.R.2d 1478
(1950); Lindsey v. State, 189 Tenn. 355,- 225 S.W.2d 533, 15 A.L.R.2d 527 (1949);
and the annotations to those cases in 13 A.L.R.2d 1482 (1950) and 15 id. 534 (1951).
128. It is possible that the observations of the jurors may not be uniform. If only
a few observe this differently from the rest, the discrepancy can be taken to mean that
in the selection of the jury some individuals were chosen who had sensory or other
disabilities. But if there is general disagreement among the jurors, it is most readily
explained by an error on the part of the judge in permitting the jurors to observe what
he should have known such men cannot observe. He must have incorrectly judged their
capacity to accomplish the perceptual purpose of the offer.
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